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ABSTRACT
What Normative Terms Mean





is dissertation is a study in how inquiry into the meaning of normative language can illu-
minate classic questions in ethics and metaethics.
Chapter  motivates and develops what I call condition semantics for normative terms.
Much work in philosophy of language has focused on modeling our understanding of ordi-
nary factual sentences like ‘e cat is on the mat’. Such sentences are standardly treated as
describing possible worlds, or ways the worldmight be. But declarative sentences can distin-
guish amongways thingsmight bemore broadly. In conversationwe coordinate not only our
beliefs about the world, but also our plans, emotions, values, and feelings. I argue that, just
as ordinary factual sentences distinguish among possible worlds (or test whether a possible
world meets a certain condition), so do normative sentences distinguish among normative
standards (or test whether a normative standard meets a certain condition). Normative sen-
tences place conditions on normative standards, conditions normative standardsmust satisfy
in order for them to be characterized by those sentences. e framework of condition se-
mantics offers a perspicuous way of posing classic ethical and metaethical questions— e.g.,
concerning expressivism, cognitivism, relativism, realism, and judgment internalism. is
can encourage clearer, better motivated answers and suggest new ways the dialectic may
proceed.
Chapter  develops an account of the distinction between weak necessity modals like
‘ought’ and ‘should’, on the one hand, and strong necessity modals like ‘must’ and ‘have to’,
vi
on the other. I argue that what makes weak necessity modals “weak” is that they express
a kind of conditional necessity, necessity on the supposition that the “applicability condi-
tions” of certain premises (norms, values, goals, etc.) are satis ed. e resulting analysis
generalizes across readings of modals, elucidates a special role that ‘ought’ judgments play in
conversation, deliberation, and planning, and captures a wide range of seemingly disparate
linguistic phenomena. Clarifying the distinction between weak and strong necessity modals
is not merely of linguistic interest. Greater sensitivity to differences among necessity modals
can improve theorizing on broader philosophical issues. I consider three: moral dilemmas,
supererogation, and judgment internalism.
Whereas Chapters  and  suggest ways in which philosophy of language can inform
ethics and metaethics, Chapter  shows how insights from ethical theory can improve our
understanding of natural language. It is common in ethics to distinguish what we objectively
ought to do from what we subjectively ought to do— that is, what we ought to do given
all the facts about the world, known and unknown, from what we ought to do given our
evidence, limited as it invariably is. But at rst glance it appears that the standard analysis
for modals stemming from Angelika Kratzer implicitly assumes that we always ought to do
what we objectively ought to do. I argue that, contrary to the standard semantics, relative
deontic value between possibilities sometimes depends on which possibilities are live. I then
develop an ordering semantics for modals and conditionals that captures this point. e
linguist, like any other practicing scientist, oen comes to the theoretical table with various
implicit philosophical views. By locating these assumptions, the philosopher of language can
free up the linguist and help expand the range of candidate theories.
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CHAPTER I
Truth Conditions and the
Meanings of Ethical Terms∗
Abstract
is chapter motivates and develops what I call a condition semantics for moral
terms. According to condition semantics, moral sentences conventionally distinguish
among moral standards (or test whether a moral standard meets a certain condition)
just as ordinary factual sentences conventionally distinguish among possible worlds (or
test whether a possible worldmeets a certain condition). is point is captured formally
within an extension of a familiar truth-conditional paradigm. e resulting analysis im-
proves upon its main competitors: invariantism and contextualism. e framework of
condition semantics also offers a perspicuous way of posing various classical ethical and
metaethical questions— e.g., concerning relativism, expressivism, and judgment inter-
nalism. is can motivate clearer, better motivated answers and suggest new ways the
dialectic may proceed.
. Truth conditions in ethics and metaethics
Other things being equal, it would be nice to have a semantics that differentiates the truth
conditions of () and ().
*Forthcoming in Russ Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. . For helpful discussion and
comments, thanks to Matthew Chrisman, Jan Dowell, Billy Dunaway, Andy Egan, Dmitri Gallow, Dan Greco,
Tristram McPherson, Sarah Moss, David Plunkett, Peter Railton, Dan Singer, Eric Swanson, and audiences at
the University of Michigan Graduate Student Working Group and the Eighth Annual Wisconsin Metaethics
Workshop. anks especially to Allan Gibbard for extensive discussion and comments on previous dras.

() Torturing babies for fun is wrong.
() No more than four colors are needed to color a map in a plane so that no adjacent
regions share the same color. (the Four Color eorem)
On the face of it, () and () carry different information; as you know, () and () are about
totally different things. Similarly, it is not counterintuitive that semantic competence with
() requires a certain non-trivial ability; not just anyone counts as understanding ().
Unfortunately, it is hard to see how we can capture these two intuitions if certain familiar
positions about truth-conditional content and moral truths are right.
- 
e semantic content of a declarative sentence is, or at least determines, its truth con-
ditions (represented as a set of possibilities).
  
If the proposition expressed by a moral sentence like () is true (false) at all, it is true
(false) necessarily— i.e., true (false) at all possible worlds.
 
Moral sentences semantically express (or determine) ordinary possible worlds propo-
sitions and are interpretedwith respect to an invariantmoral view or standard, namely,
the correct one.
It follows from these claims that a moral sentence like () has the set of all possible worlds
as its truth conditions. Assuming that mathematical truths like () are necessary truths, the
truth conditions of () and () will be equivalent. Similarly, the above positions seem to im-
ply that semantic competence—of the sort that requires an ability to correctly distinguish
among possibilities—with moral sentences requires no more than an ability to “divide” the
space of possibilities intoW and∅. (More on this requirement for semantic competence be-
low.) I am not endorsing these familiar positions just yet. e point here is simply that these
ways of thinking which we may be drawn to adopt— and which oen are adopted— lead to
a puzzle. We will be revising them in due course. (For concreteness I will tend to couch our

discussion in terms of speci cally moral language, though much of it applies to normative
language more generally.)
is puzzle is, of course, a familiar one from possible worlds semantics, oen known as
the problem of logical omniscience. (By calling it a “problem” I am not suggesting that progress
has not been made on it.) But it seems particularly problematic in the moral case. If the
problem of how () and ‘ +  = ’ say the same thing is a real problem, the problem of how
() and () say the same thing is even worse.
A number of options are available in reply. First, one might deny that there is a puzzle:
“Sure,” one might say, “() and () have the same truth conditions, but this isn’t a problem
since they express different propositions.” One might cash out this sort of reply in terms
of structured propositions, impossible worlds, or a model theory that treats propositions as
primitives. Or onemight employ a Stalnakerian diagonalization strategy and say that though
() and () semantically express the same proposition, and have the same truth conditions,
we reinterpret them as having relevantly different asserted contents in conversation. For the
moment I want to put these responses to the side. It will be instructive to examine whether
we can nd a theory that differentiates the truth conditions of sentences like () and (). So
let’s assume as a working hypothesis there is a puzzle— that, other things equal, it would be
preferable to distinguish the truth conditions of () and ().
Granting that there is a puzzle, onemight respondby giving up.
One might do so by denying that moral sentences are true or false. But this is a high cost;
even contemporary heirs of emotivism grant that moral sentences have truth values. Instead
one might say that though moral sentences like () have truth values, their truth values vary
across possible worlds. But this is also a tough bullet to bite. It seems eminently plausible that
no matter how the world might be or might have been, if anything is right or wrong at all,
torturing babies for fun couldn’t not have been wrong. At least somemoral truths seem to be
necessary. (Moving to epistemically possible worlds won’t help: For all I know, no matter
how the world could have been, torturing babies for fun couldn’t not have been wrong. e
reader may feel free to substitute her favorite candidate necessary moral truth.)
For one thing, there is as yet no consistent theory of structured propositions (for recent discussions see
C a,b, D ). For worries with the propositions-as-primitives and impossible worlds ap-
proaches, see, e.g., C . I return to diagonalization and the impossible worlds approach in §..
Cf., e.g., M : ; G : ; P a: , b: , –, –.

Alternatively, one might respond by denying - . But this is
also a tough bullet to bite. Even if propositions need to be individuated more nely than by
their truth conditions, it is uncontroversial that propositions at least determine truth condi-
tions. is is all we need to get our puzzle going.
With that said, a brief motivation of the picture of content I have in mind may be in or-
der. I am sympathetic with the standard view of (semantic and mental) content according to
which contents function to distinguish among possibilities. Semantic competence with a sen-
tence—knowing a sentence’s conventional meaning (or at least its conventionally proffered
content)— requires having a certain capacity: a capacity to correctly divide the space of pos-
sibilities, to correctly rule out a certain set of possibilities from some domain. Equivalently,
it requires having the ability, when given a possibility or circumstance, to tell whether the
sentence is true or false in it. (Even if this is not the only requirement for semantic compe-
tence, it is surely an important one.) For a simplistic example, being semantically competent
with ‘e diamond is inside the box’ requires having the following sort of capacity: a capacity
to know that it is true if shown a picture like (a); to know that it is false if shown a picture
like (b); and to correctly rule out a certain subset of situations from a domain, as in (c).
() a.
b.
See, e.g., L , C , S , , among many others. I do not speak to
Davidsonian versions of truth-conditional semantics here. In what follows I will oen speak of “knowing what
an expressionmeans,” or “understanding an expression,” or “being semantically competent with an expression.”
If one wishes to eschew complications from “knowing what/how” and “understanding” talk, one may construe
my discussion in terms of one important component of semantic competence. Our question is what the con-
ventional contents of moral expressions are, at the relevant level of abstraction, where these contents serve as
a rational reconstruction or model of speakers’ dispositions to interpret moral language; they represent one
important component of what is grasped by language users, under certain idealizations, who are semantically
competent with this fragment of the language. (By ‘conventional’ I mean, to a rst approximation, “not calcu-




It may turn out that the problems facing truth-conditional pictures of content are too
great. For now, though, let’s take it as our starting point, for it will help bring into relief
important issues about the meanings of moral terms, issues which are independent of the
possible worlds framework. We will end up revising the standard picture anyhow. So for the
moment let’s suppose that propositions determine truth conditions, which are represented
by a set of possibilities, and let’s see where this takes us. (All I need is this determination
relation, though for simplicity I’ll oen identify propositions with their truth conditions.)
If one likes, one can treat my inquiry as a conditional: If it’s right to think of meaning and
content as determining truth conditions in roughly this way, what implications does this have
for our understanding of the meanings of ethical terms? As we will see in §., approaching
the semantics of ethical terms from this perspective will suggest a new, illuminating way of
understanding various classic metaethical questions and positions. But I’m getting ahead of
myself.
is leaves us with  . On the face of it,   seems
attractive. By treating the moral standard relevant for interpretation as determined by and
invariant across possible worlds, it seems to capture the objective purport of moral language,
or how the “moral order… is… part of the fundamental nature of the universe (and… of any
possible universe in which there were moral agents at all)” (R : ). And by treating
moral sentences as expressing ordinary possible worlds propositions, it can make use of the
powerful resources of truth-conditional semantics. Nevertheless I think we should reject
 .
ere are good reasons to think we should not build substantive normative assumptions
about what the correct moral theory is into the meanings of moral terms. For example,
suppose classical utilitarianism is correct, and () is true iff torturing babies for fun does not
maximize overall pleasure. Even if she is fully informed about all the non-normative facts,
the non-utilitarian could coherently disagree with these “truth conditions” while knowing

what () means. Instead she might think that () is true iff torturing babies for fun does not
maximize one’s self-perfections.
is point— that we should not build substantive normative views into our semantics for
moral terms— is not a new one: ough it is sometimes underappreciated in metaethics, it
has a rich history in philosophy of language and semantics. For example, here are Stalnaker
and Lewis:
[O]ne can and should answer questions about the semantics and pragmatics of
constructions involving the words good and right without solving philosophical
problems about the nature of morality. (S : )
e semantic analysis tells us what is true (at a world) under an ordering. It
modestly declines to choose the proper ordering. at is work for a moralist,
not a semanticist. (L : –)
And slightly modifying a point of Kaplan’s in a related context: If we avoid confusing sub-
stantive normative and metaphysical matters with phenomena of the semantics of moral
terms, “the result can only be healthy for all… disciplines” (: ). We can put the con-
dition as follows: emeanings of moral expressions do not presuppose some particular view on
how to live.
As our discussion of the role of content suggests,   fails to capture
what is said or conventionally communicated in speakers’ utterances of moral sentences, and
what it takes to be semantically competent with a moral expression, to know what a moral
expression means. We said that being semantically competent with a sentence requires, per-
haps among other things, being able to divide in the right way the alternative possible ways
the world might be or might have been. But if certain moral claims are necessarily true (if
true) or necessarily false (if false), then “understanding” such claims claim involves trivially
“distinguishing” among worlds, either ruling them all out or ruling none out.
But how can we reject   while accepting a truth-conditional picture
of content? How can we accept that the semantic (conventional) content of () is (or deter-
mines) its truth conditions while denying that the conditions in the world that would have
ough certain expressivists, as I understand them, have also urged asmuch (e.g., G b, ).

to obtain for () to be true constitute (or determine) the content of ()? I suggest that it is the
phrase “conditions in the world” that is an important source of our confusion. Distinguish
the following three questions:

What property (or properties), if any, do all and only wrong actions (necessarily) have?

What, if anything, grounds the fact that wrong actions are wrong? Fundamentally,
what, if anything, makes it the case that wrong actions are wrong?

Given a moral sentence ϕ, what would the correct moral view have to be like for ϕ to
be true?
E is a substantive normative question. It is a question of what the correct
normative ethical view is. For example, if classical utilitarianism is correct, all wrong actions
have the property of not maximizing overall happiness. By contrast,  is, plausi-
bly, ametaphysical question. What grounds the wrongness of torturing babies for funmay be
that the action instantiates a certain natural property—per the reductive or non-reductive
naturalist—or some irreducibly normative non-natural property—per the non-naturalist.
For example, according to certain forms of metaethical constructivism, the wrongness of
an agent’s torturing babies for fun is grounded purely by properties concerning that agent’s
evaluative attitudes. E and  are thus substantive normative and
metanormative questions. But they are not, strictly speaking, semantic questions, questions
relevant in our theorizing about conventional natural language meaning. Semantic compe-
tence with normative terms like ‘wrong’ does not require that one have an answer, let alone
the correct answer, to these questions.
Instead, I suggest that— as the name suggests— it is  that is the properly se-
mantic question, a question of the conventional meaning of ‘wrong’. Semantic competence
with an ordinary factual sentence requires knowing how the world would have to be for the
sentence to be true. Semantic competence with a de se factual sentence requires knowing
when and where one would have to be located in the world for the sentence to be true. And,
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by extension, semantic competence with amoral sentence—knowingwhat amoral sentence
means— requires knowing how things would have to be morally for the sentence to be true,
or what the correct moral view would have to be like, for the sentence to be true. If know-
ing a sentence’s meaning requires being able to distinguish possibilities in the right way, it
is plausible that knowing a moral sentence’s meaning requires being able to correctly distin-
guish certain moral possibilities. (Again, this is not to deny that there are other aspects of
the conventional and non-conventional meaning, broadly construed, of moral terms.) is
suggests that we individuate the truth conditions of moral sentences more nely than by
their possible worlds truth conditions. Following the lead of Stalnaker, Lewis, and Kaplan,
we should replace   with
 
Moral terms must be interpreted with respect to some moral standard or other, but
their meanings do not presuppose some particular view on how to live.
As   suggests, the sorts of truth conditions that re ect what it takes to
know what a moral sentence means are conditions on how things might be morally. By con-
trast, what conditionsmust obtain in the world for amoral sentence to be true is a substantive
issue. (I use ‘substantive’ broadly to describe rst-order normative issues and non-semantic
metanormative issues.) Failure to distinguish the semantics and metaphysics of moral talk,
or distinguish semantically relevant truth conditions from substantive normative and meta-
physical grounding conditions, has contributed to the confusion over the broader metaethi-
cal implications of accepting—and reaping the compositional bene ts of— a truth-conditional
semantics.
Wenow have the resources to outline the form of a response to our initial puzzle. M
, unlike  , does not render the semantically relevant truth
conditions of () and () equivalent, even when conjoined with   
and our truth-conditional picture of content. Even if, as a normative or metaphysical matter,
some moral sentences like () are true in all possible worlds, those sentences need not be
true according to all moral standards or views on how to live (cf. n. ). Just as knowing
what ‘Grass is green’ means requires being able to rule out worlds in which grass isn’t green
e problem is pervasive. See, e.g., B : –, : ch. ; S : –.

(regardless of whether or not the actual world happens to be one of them), knowing what ()
means requires being able to rule out moral standards according which torturing babies for
fun isn’t wrong (regardless of whether or not the correct moral standard happens to be one
them).
is response brings a number of questions in its wake. For one, how are we to cash out
 ? We will address this question in §., but rst I would like to address
three concerns.
Worry: e problem of logical omniscience is, as noted above, a general problem. It
also arises, arguably, in the case of names, natural kind terms, mathematical expressions, etc.
Should we think that invariantism for all these types of expressions is incorrect too? Why
not think that solutions to the problem of logical omniscience in these other domains will
carry over to provide a successful alternative treatment of moral terms?
Reply: Nothing in what I have said here requires that all instances of the problem of
logical omniscience be handled in the same way. I see no a priori reason to think that moral
terms, names, etc. should all be treated uniformly. Aer all, they are a pretty multifarious
lot. Perhaps they should all be given a non-invariantist semantics of the sort I will defend in
§., but perhaps not. In the case of moral terms, such a semantics, I will argue, improves
upon its most prominent alternatives. Whether it improves upon all alternatives obviously
waits to be seen.
Worry: Even if we should not build substantive assumptions about which normative eth-
ical theory is correct into the semantics, the meanings of moral terms might still presuppose
some particular view on how to live. Why can’t the advocate of   say
that moral terms are interpreted with respect to the correct moral theory, whatever it is? e
description ‘the correct moral theory, whatever it is’ would pick out some particular moral
view, but would not build in any substantive assumptions about which one it is.
Reply: To say that moral terms are interpreted with respect to “the correct moral theory,
whatever it is” supports  , not  . For it effectively
treats the meaning of a moral sentences as, in some sense (see §.), a function from moral
standards to truth values. Compare: e meaning of an ordinary factual sentence like S
‘Grass is green’ does not presuppose some particular view on which world is actual. ough
S is, in a certain sense, interpreted with respect to “the actual world, whatever it is,” this is just

to say that the meaning of S is a function from worlds to truth values; knowing what Smeans
requires knowing that if such-and-such world is actual, S is true (false). Similarly, knowing
what amoral sentence like ()means requires knowing that if such-and-suchmoral standard
is the correct one, () is true (false). But this is just what   says.
Worry: If moral terms are interpreted with respect to a varyingmoral standard, does this
imply that there are no absolute, objective moral truths? Or that moral matters are merely
“matters of taste”? Or that moral disagreement is “faultless”?
Reply: No such conclusions follow from anything said thus far. M  is a
soberly semantic thesis. A semantics is supposed to capture, at the relevant level of abstrac-
tion, an expression’s conventional meaning. Building the correct moral standard into the
conventional contents of moral terms fails to capture what it takes to be semantically com-
petent with them. One cannot avoid the “core questions” in metaethics simply by denying
 . Ethicists and metaethicists can still examine questions like the fol-
lowing: Are there any normative reasons that all agents have? What natural or non-natural
property, if any, do all and only things that areN (for some normative predicate ‘N’) necessar-
ily have? If there is such a property, is it reducible? Do normative facts hold independently
of the evaluative attitudes of the agents to whom they apply? For all I have argued there may
be independent support for all sorts of normatively and metaphysically robust ethical and
metaethical positions. But such support will need to be just that: independent (of semantics).
Plausibly the meanings of moral terms do not presuppose verdicts on such loy issues. At
minimum, the way the semantics and other areas interact is going to be more complicated
than we might have initially thought.
As we will see in §., delineating issues oen con ated in metaethics under the general
heading of “meaning” will have signi cant payoffs. Among other things, it will suggest an
alternative way of capturing the putative objective purport of moral language. More gener-
ally, it will help us articulate certain classical metaethical questions in a more perspicuous
way, and clarify what is at stake in the dialectic between overall metaethical theories. Before
addressing these issues, let’s see if we can make   more precise.
anks to Jan Dowell for pressing me on this issue. As we will see in §., I take the intuitions motivating
this reply as favoring a non-contextualist implementation of  .
is is contrary to the view expressed in S : , , , .
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. Contextualism and condition semantics
Here, again, is our conclusion to be explained: Moral terms are interpreted with respect to
some relevant moral standard but do not themselves presuppose some particular view on
how to live. But what is the “relevant moral standard”?
Two familiar answers suggest themselves. To set the stage, let’s brie y get some termi-
nology on the table. On a broadly Kaplanian view there are two senses of the “meaning”
of an expression: its character and its content (K ). Character is a function from
contexts of use to contents and is constant across all literal uses of an expression; it represents
an expression’s linguistic meaning, or what you know when you know what an expression
means. Content is (or at least determines) an intension, a function from indices—or, in
Kaplan’s terminology, “circumstances of evaluation”— to extensions. (More on “indices”
below.) e content of a predicate is a property, and the content of a sentence is a proposi-
tion. e semantic content of a sentence is, roughly, what is conventionally communicated
by the sentence in the relevant context, as determined by the language’s composition rules.
e context includes parameters that determine content from character, xing the reference
Figure .: Context-index semantics (from L : )
of indexicals and other deictic expressions. e index includes parameters of evaluation that
determine extension from content (e.g., the truth-value of a proposition). e index consists
of those features of context that can be shied by operators in the language (e.g., modals, at-
titude verbs). For Kaplan, the index is just a possible world, or perhaps a world-time pair.
e extensions of expressions are thus de ned relative to points of evaluation, consisting of
context and index.
For example, in a context c where Sara is speaker, the sentence S ‘I like brownie sundaes’
expresses the proposition, or conventionally carries the information, that Sara likes brownie
sundaes. Supposing Sara actually likes brownie sundaes, the proposition expressed by S in

c is true in the actual world. But considering a possible world u in which Sara does not like
brownie sundaes, the proposition expressed by S in c is false when evaluated at u. (In set-talk:
the actual world, but not u, is in the proposition expressed by S in c.) is is all more-or-less
standard fare from Kaplan (cf. S , K , L ).
is context-index framework (or “double indexing semantics,” as it is sometimes called)
suggests two familiar answers to the question—call it ‘’—of what moral stan-
dard is “relevant” for the interpretation of moral terms: (a) that it is supplied from the con-
text, and (b) that it is supplied from the index. Call a view according to which the relevant
standard is supplied from the context contextualism. Call a view according to which the rel-
evant standard is supplied from the index condition semantics. (Reasons for this name will
become evident below. For those familiar with the recent literature on contextualism and
relativism about epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste, it might seem that what
I am calling ‘condition semantics’ is oen called ‘relativism’. However, as I will suggest in
§., relativism is better understood as a particular type of condition semantics, one that
takes a stand on certain further issues that are orthogonal to the points at issue between
contextualism and condition semantics considered in this section. To make terminological
matters worse, many positions in the ethics and metaethics literatures described as versions
of “moral relativism” are really instances of contextualism on the current taxonomy.)
e debate over  has centered around the problem of disagreement, the
problem of accounting for how speakers uttering moral sentences ϕ and ¬ϕ, respectively,
count as disagreeing, rather than, e.g., as making consistent claims about their respective
moral standards. I would like to put this way of approaching  to the side. (For
one thing, I take it that a semantics need only focus on accounting for inconsistency or con-
tradictoriness rather than disagreement, a plausibly pragmatic notion, but no matter: It is
contentious whether either side has a distinct advantage in stating a notion of disagreement
that accounts for all the data anyway.) Instead I would like to revive the debate over -
 by turning to a different issue, one more neatly tied to the semantics of normative
language: How do contextualism and condition semantics fare in their respective abilities to
See, e.g., DR , E  . , L , E , MF , S-
 b, Y ,  F & G , D .
See, e.g., MF ,  F & G , D .
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capture what you know when you know what a moral sentence means, or what is required
for being semantically competent with a moral sentence? On my preferred understanding of
contextualism and condition semantics, both are moved by  ; however,
they intend to capture it in different ways. ese differences generate different accounts of
the contents of moral sentences. In the remainder of this section I will argue that, in light of
our above discussion about the role of content in semantic theorizing, condition semantics’s
account of the contents of moral sentences better captures what we know when we know
what moral sentences mean than contextualism’s. (Again, I want to emphasize that we are
considering speci cally truth-conditional aspects of meaning, as described in §.. Given
our purposes, I leave open whether the arguments below generalize to motivate condition
semantics for personal taste predicates, epistemic modals, vague terms, etc.; however, I am
inclined to think they do.)
Start with contextualism. According to contextualism, moral terms are interpreted with
respect to a contextually relevant moral standard, where which particular moral standard is
relevant varies across contexts. ‘ϕ is wrong’ is context-sensitive, expressing different propo-
sitions in different contexts, even if ϕ contains no context-sensitive items itself. Roughly, ()
is true at a point of evaluation—a context-index pair— iff torturing babies for fun is wrong
according to the relevant moral standard of the context.
Does this contextualist proposal capturewhat you knowwhen you knowwhat ()means?
Or what you believe when you believe what () says? Start with mental content. Is believing
Pace D , , which views the main motivation (of at least contextualism) as being to explain
judgment internalism.
As is standard in descriptive semantics, the analyses given here and below are not intended to provide
individuals who do not understand ethical terms with such an understanding; rather they are models, at the
relevant level of abstraction, of speakers’ dispositions to interpret moral language (cf. n. ). Even so, the stan-
dard frameworks of ordering semantics and premise semantics (e.g., L , V , K
, ) suggest a number of ways of giving an illuminating, non-trivial characterization of what it is for an
action to be wrong according to a moral standard. One option is to treat a moral standard as a set of proposi-
tions P whose truth is required by morality, on some view of what morality requires, or as a set of propositions
that describe some putative moral ideal (e.g., propositions like that no murders occur, that overall average
happiness is maximized, that each individual maximizes her own self-perfections, etc.). To a rst approxima-
tion, ‘ϕ is wrong’ would mean that ¬ϕ follows from every maximally consistent subset of P. Equivalently, the
semantics could be couched in terms of orderings induced by P (L ). I continue to talk of “moral
standards” simply for heuristic purposes. Jumping ahead, whereas the contextualist would treat P as supplied
by the context, the condition semanticist would treat it as supplied by the index.
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that torturing babies is wrong a state of mind about one’s moral standards? It seems not. As-
sume that believing what a sentence S says is a matter of believing the proposition expressed
by S. First, if I ask you why to believe that torturing babies is wrong, I am asking for con-
siderations regarding the action of torturing babies, not considerations regarding your, or
whomever else’s, moral views about torturing babies.
Second, suppose you offer George, your pet chimpanzee, a brightly colored plant to eat.
Having grown up in the great outdoors, George recognizes that the plant is poisonous and
recoils. You say:
() George knows he shouldn’t eat the plant.
is seems true. But, contrary to the contextualist, it is implausible that () is true only if
George knows that his eating the plant is incompatible with his, or anyone else’s, normative
views. (Obviously I am generalizing to types of normative language beyond the narrowly
moral.) He’s just a monkey. He might barely know he exists. Similarly, suppose you encour-
age Gabriel, your infant brother, to put his ngers into the electrical outlet. Gabriel, smart
chap that he is, recoils; his mother has repeatedly scolded him not to do so. You say:
() Gabriel knows he shouldn’t put his ngers into the outlet.
is seems true; you are attributing a certain normative belief to Gabriel. But it is implausible
that () is true only if Gabriel has a belief about his, or anyone else’s, normative views. Aer
all, he’s just a baby.
In these ways contextualism seems to have trouble capturing what your state of mind
is when you have a normative belief. It is (c), not (b), with which (a) has an important
semantic connection (though this is not to say they are equivalent).
() a. Sara thinks torturing babies for fun is wrong.
b. Sara thinks torturing babies for fun is wrong according to her.
c. According to Sara’s moral views, torturing babies for fun is wrong.
Whether one can represent or take a certain perspective on normative standards is indepen-
dent of whether one can have a normative standard. Call this point ‘-  
Cf. Y : .

’.
Return to linguistic content. Consider the context-dependency of words like ‘I’ and ‘ev-
ery’. Knowing the linguistic meaning of ‘I’ requires being able to say, given a context of
utterance c, that ‘I’ picks out the speaker of c. Knowing what ‘I like brownie sundaes’ means
requires knowing, given a context c, that the speaker of c likes brownie sundaes. If you don’t
know who the speaker is in the context, you don’t know what was said, or what proposition
was expressed. You don’t know what possibilities have been ruled out, and whether your
information state is compatible with the possibilities that have not been ruled out. Similarly
with quanti ers. Knowing what ‘Everyone likes brownie sundaes’ means requires knowing
that, given a context c, for all x in the relevant domain speci ed by c, x likes brownie sundaes.
If you don’t knowwhat the contextually relevant domain is, you don’t knowwhat proposition
was expressed (every human being? every child?). You don’t know whether your informa-
tion state is compatible with the possibilities that have not been ruled out. e same goes for
other types of context-sensitive expressions— e.g., demonstratives, gradable adjectives, rela-
tional expressions (‘enemy’, ‘local’), neutral modal verbs (‘can’, ‘must’), adverbial quanti ers
(‘usually’, ‘occasionally’)—but you get the idea.
Does the same hold with moral terms? It seems not. Suppose the contextually relevant
moral standard for the interpretation of () is Sara’s. Intuitively, it doesn’t seem that knowing
what () says in this context involves an ability to rule out the following possibilities: those
in which torturing babies for fun isn’t wrong according to Sara. By contrast, knowing what
‘I like brownie sundaes’ says when uttered by Sara does seem to involve an ability to rule out
the following possibilities: those in which Sara doesn’t like brownie sundaes.
is point is suggestive but perhaps not decisive. We saw that with context-dependent
items like ‘I’ and ‘every’, among others, we can only retrieve the intended truth conditions
given certain contextual cues; the semantic interpretation of such items is incomplete in an
important sense. Is there a similar semantic incompleteness with moral terms? It seems not.
I can determine the intended truth conditions of a sentence like () even if I have no idea
who the speaker is or what the context is like. Similarly, consider ().
() Nathan should be here by now.
I don’t know what () says unless I know what avor of modality ‘should’ expresses. Is

‘should’ to be given an epistemic reading? A deontic reading? But once I know that the
context determines, say, a particular type of deontic reading—and I know the referents of
‘here’ and ‘now’— I seem to know precisely what () says. And I know whether my informa-
tion state is compatible with the possibilities it doesn’t rule out. Call this point ‘
’.
In these ways, the meanings of normative terms do not pattern with the meanings of
context-dependent expressions. Knowing what ‘wrong’ means does not require knowing
that, given a context c, ‘wrong’ picks out those actions that arewrong according to the relevant
standard of c.
It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to demonstrate clear disanalogies between
moral terms and every kind of context-sensitive expression. But, rst, my goal here is to help
build a good inductive case that moral terms are not context-sensitive in the sense at issue.
What is lacking is a contextualist analysis that meets all of the challenges canvassed. In cer-
tain semantically relevant respects, moral terms behave quite unlike pure indexicals, demon-
stratives, nominal and adverbial quanti ers, relational expressions, gradable adjectives, and
(neutral) modal auxiliaries, all generally accepted as types of context-sensitive expressions.
is gives us reason to investigate whether any non-contextualist analyses fare better. Sec-
ond, the arguments presented here provide a case againstmoral terms being context-sensitive
in a lexically speci c way. is leaves open whether moral terms are context-sensitive in the
broader sense concerning the conversational, discourse-level standard-setting discussed in
L b. Ultimately I think that condition semantics for moral terms integrates better
with this type of pragmatic picture of conversation. But that is a topic for another paper (see
S c).
ese same phenomena that the contextualist has difficulty capturing support condi-
tion semantics. First let’s clarify the rough-and-ready explication of condition semantics
e contextualist might respond by treating the semantic content of a moral claim as a set of contexts,
rather than as a set of worlds or indices (see S , A & N , S ; though
cf.  S ).
(i) λc . JϕKc,wc
On this analysis, the content of () is the set of contexts such that torturing babies for fun is wrong according to
the relevant moral standard of that context. ere may be reasons for introducing this kind of context shiing
into the semantics. But insofar as doing so effectively integrates moral standards into the semantic content in
the same way as worlds, this type of analysis appears to be structurally isomorphic to condition semantics.

from the beginning of this section. We started with a standard view of content according to
which contents function to distinguish among possibilities. An ordinary factual sentence,
on this view, places a condition on possible worlds; it describes what property a world must
have for it to be characterized by that sentence. But as we noted in our discussion of prob-
lems facing  , sentences do not always simply characterize ways the
world, narrowly construed, might be. Sentences can distinguish among ways things might
be, broadly understood— for example, regarding how things might be morally, or what the
correct moral view(s) might be. Condition semantics captures this feature of moral thought
and talk. According to condition semantics, sentences (in context) place conditions on var-
ious sorts of items, conditions that the items in question must satisfy in order for them to
be characterized by those sentences—hence ‘condition semantics’. Moral sentences place
conditions on, or express properties of, moral standards just like ordinary factual sentences
place conditions on, or express properties of, possible worlds. Just as ordinary factual sen-
tences test whether a possible world meets a certain condition, moral sentences test whether
a moral standard meets a certain condition. (If condition semantics is correct for predicates
of personal taste, epistemic modals and adjectives, vague predicates, etc.— again, a point I
leave open here—we would likewise understand sentences containing these expressions as
placing conditions on standards of taste, credal states, standards of precision, etc.)
We noted in §. that semantic competence with an ordinary factual sentence like ‘e
diamond is in the box’ requires being able to say, given some situation w, whether the dia-
mond has the property of being inside the box in w. is motivated the view that ‘e dia-
mond is in the box’ has as its content a certain set of possible circumstances, those in which
the diamond is in the box. For the condition semanticist, the picture is precisely parallel. Se-
mantic competence with a moral sentence requires being able to correctly say whether, for
any relevant moral standard i, if things are that way morally, or if that is the correct moral
view, then the sentence is true. e contents of moral sentences give a rule for selecting a
subset of moral standards from some domain— in the case of (), a rule for selecting those
moral standards according to which torturing babies for fun is wrong. So, if the standard
possibility-distinguishing view of content is roughly on the right track, condition semantics
seems to be its natural heir in the case of moral terms.
Condition semantics captures these points formally by interpreting moral terms with

respect to a parameter of the index, rather than a parameter of the context. For the con-
textualist (and the invariantist), the index consists of a world parameter, and perhaps also
a time parameter. However, there is nothing inherent in the Kaplanian framework that re-
quires this restriction. As even Kaplan and Lewis acknowledge, the index can consist of any
parameters that can be shied by expressions that operate on content. For the condition
semanticist, the index also includes a parameter i that ranges over moral standards. Indices
are thus treated as pairs ⟨w, i⟩ of a world w and moral standard i. (I will systematically ig-
nore times.) e contents of sentences and attitudes are treated as sets of ⟨w, i⟩ pairs, rather
than as sets of worlds, as per the invariantist and the contextualist. (I will continue to call
such contents ‘propositions’ for the moment, but we will return to this in §..) e exten-
sion of an expression—e.g., the truth value of a sentence— is determined with respect to a
context and a ⟨w, i⟩ pair, which is the index. Just as ordinary factual sentences denote truth
values with respect to a world of evaluation, so, on this picture, do moral sentences denote
truth values with respect to a moral standard (and world). (If one likes, the values “true” and
“false” can be understood simply as characterizing sets in the usual way.) We can represent
the truth conditions of () roughly as follows, in equivalent function- and set-talk (see n. ).
() a. () is true in c at ⟨w, i⟩ iff torturing babies for fun is wrong according to i in w
b. {⟨w, i⟩∶ torturing babies for fun is wrong according to i in w}
ough moral sentences—unlike simple, ordinary factual sentences—have truth condi-
tions that need not place non-trivial conditions on the world parameter, they have truth
conditions just the same.
Two points of clari cation. First, condition semantics is not simply a kind of “cen-
tered worlds” semantics. Centered content is typically understood in terms of self-location.
But distinguishing among moral standards does not seem to be reducible to distinguishing
among where one might be located in the world. We must distinguish individuals from the
moral standards they might accept.
Second, we can now give a more precise analysis of what a “moral sentence” is. Al-
L : – and K : , , n. are particularly forthright on this point. So, pace
B & F (: , ), there is nothing “radical” in a relativist semantics as such.
Pace suggestions in E  . , E , S , W . anks to
Allan Gibbard for pressing me on this point.

though all propositions may be treated as sets of world-moral standard ⟨w, i⟩ pairs, not all
propositions will interestingly depend on the value of moral standard parameter. Morality-
independent propositions are sets of ⟨w, i⟩ pairs such that if one pair is in the set, so is every
pair with the same world coordinate. Ordinary factual sentences like ‘Sara likes brownie
sundaes’ express morality-independent propositions. Morality-dependent propositions, like
(), are sets of ⟨w, i⟩ pairs that are not morality-independent propositions. Moral sentences,
we might say, are those sentences that express morality-dependent propositions. (So, on this
semantic characterization, not all complex sentences containing moral terms will be “moral
sentences” in this sense.) ough this is certainly not the only difference between moral and
non-moral language, moral sentences, unlike non-moral sentences, place non-trivial condi-
tions on the moral standard parameter.
Condition semantics is an improvement. First, it improves on  and
captures the intuitions from the beginning of §.. Moral sentences won’t be necessary in the
sense of being “true at all indices.” () has non-trivial content: it is false with respect tomoral
standards which permit torturing babies for fun; it rules out those moral standards which do
not prohibit torturing babies for fun. We can now see that there is something problematic
in the contextualist’s response to our puzzle in §.. Our goal, in part, was to show that
moral sentences non-trivially distinguish among possibilities. Since our contextualist treats
contents as ordinary sets of worlds, she has to nd a non-empty set of worlds to rule out.
She does so via the assumption that the contextually relevant group might have different
moral views in different worlds. (), for example, would rule out those worlds in which
the contextually relevant moral standard— say, Sara’s—permits torturing babies for fun.
ough this indeed distinguishes the contents of () and (), it does so in the wrong sort of
way. () is not a claim about Sara or her moral views. It is a claim about the moral status of
torturing babies. is is what distinguishes () from a sentence like (c), reproduced below,
or (), said in a context in which we are cataloguing what Sara’s moral views are.
(c) According to Sara’s moral views, torturing babies for fun is wrong.
() Torturing babies for fun is “wrong.”
On this distinction, see, e.g., H ,  W , H . For related discussion in
linguistics on “objective” and “subjective” uses of modals, see L ; more on this in §.. of Chapter II.

e possibilities () rules out are possible moral standards, possible ways things might have
been morally. Condition semantics captures this intuition.
Second, condition semantics has a natural explanation of  .
Since the relevant moral standard does not gure into the content of moral claims— it is
used in determining extension from content—we do not need a suitably speci ed context
to determine what a given moral claim says (abstracting away from other context-sensitive
items).
Finally, let’s return to mental content. Condition semantics offers a natural explanation
of -   . To see this, start with a conservatively enriched standard
modal semantics for attitude verbs like ‘believe’ (H ). As usual, attitude verbs
can be treated as shiing the index. For condition semantics this means that attitude verbs
shi not only the world parameter but also the moral standard parameter. So, what the atti-
tude verb does is quantify over the set of possibilities, now represented at the relevant level of
abstraction as a set of world-moral standard pairs, that are compatible with the attitude state.
‘S believes ϕ’ says that S’s belief state entails the content of ϕ, relative to the given context (cf.
n. ). As in unembedded cases, complements that contain moral terms may have exten-
sions that non-trivially depend on the value of the moral standard parameter. ‘Sara believes
that torturing babies for fun is wrong’ says, roughly, that for all ⟨w′, i′⟩ pairs compatible with
Sara’s beliefs (in the world of evaluation), torturing babies for fun is wrong according to i′ in
w′. e belief ascription is true iff Sara’s moral views are a certain way, i.e., iff all live moral
standards, given her moral views, prohibit torturing babies for fun. In this way, we can cap-
ture -   and the close semantic connection between sentences like
(a) and (c).
We are now in a position to compare our approach to a Stalnakerian diagonalization
strategy and an impossible worlds approach, brie y mentioned in §. (cf. n. ). Diago-
nalization is a means of reinterpretation; it is triggered by the assertion of a sentence that
would be uninformative or trivial if interpreted with its literal meaning (S ).
First, diagonalization, in this sense, is in tension with  : If moral sen-
tences semantically express ordinary possible worlds propositions and are interpreted with
respect to an invariant moral standard, then their semantic contents presuppose some par-
ticular view on how to live. Irrespective of its story about howwe interpretmoral language in

conversation, a reinterpretation strategy faces the same problems as  :
it fails to account for what it is to be semantically competent with moral language. Second,
contingently true moral sentences will not trigger diagonalization. So, for any contingently
true moral sentence ‘ϕ is µ’ (pick your favorite), for some moral predicate µ, the diagonal-
izer will have no explanation for how its semantic content differs from that of ‘ϕ is δ’ (for
some associated descriptive, non-moral predicate δ) that would express the same possible
worlds proposition. e main difference between condition semantics and Stalnakerian di-
agonalization is that, for condition semantics, reinterpretation is not necessary to capture
the communicative content of moral sentences. Semantic competence itself requires moral
expressions to be interpreted with respect to a given moral standard.
As for the impossible worlds approach, we can now see that it will end up looking quite
similar to condition semantics. Whereas condition semantics separates the possible world
and moral standard parameters, the impossible worlds theorist builds the moral standard
into the (im)possible world. (For example, the truth conditions of () would be the set of
(im)possible worlds w′ such that torturing babies for fun is wrong according to the correct
moral standard in w′.) For any ⟨w, i⟩ pair there is a unique (im)possible world identical to
w in all non-normative respects in which i is the correct moral view. And if we restrict our-
selves to impossible worlds whose impossibility is a result of what moral views are correct in
them, the mapping from ⟨w, i⟩ pairs to (im)possible worlds is one-to-one. So, which analysis
one adopts may depend on one’s commitments regarding the broader utility and theoretical
role of impossible worlds (see n. ). But even if one wished to go in for impossible worlds on
independent grounds, separating in our theories the world and moral standard parameters
of the index can illuminate more perspicuously the structure of our semantic competence
with moral terms and what is special about their meanings as compared with the meanings
of ordinary non-normative descriptive terms. And depending on one’s views about repre-
sentation and intentional content more generally, one might think that representing moral
judgments in terms of ⟨w, i⟩ pairs rather than impossible worlds will lend itself to a pre-
ferred account of how particular morality-dependent contents count as being the contents
of agents’ beliefs and other attitudes. (We will return to this issue in §..)
anks to Andy Egan and Eric Swanson for helpful discussion.

. A way forward in metaethics
In §. I argued that we should not build substantive normative assumptions into the mean-
ings of moral terms. is motivated contextualism and condition semantics over invari-
antism. In §. I argued that a variety of further phenomena motivate condition semantics
over contextualism: Moral sentences place conditions on moral standards.
Now for a hitch—okay, two hitches. First, condition semantics may seem similar to cer-
tain versions of relativism in the sense familiar from recent contextualism-relativismdebates.
Is condition semantics committed to being “relativist”?
Second, we articulated condition semantics within a familiar truth-conditional frame-
work. However, condition semantics seems to look a lot like the version of expressivism
developed in G b, , which, at least prima facie, purports to be non-truth-
conditional. In Gibbard’s () response to the Frege-Geach problem he develops a nor-
mative logic based, roughly, on assigning truth values to sentences relative to triples of con-
text, world, and “hyperplan.” (A hyperplan is a maximal contingency plan, or a plan that, for
any occasion or decision onemight conceivably be in, either forbids or permits an alternative
open on such an occasion. e semantics in his b is couched in terms of “systems of
norms” rather than hyperplans.) e content of an attitude or judgment is given in terms of
the world-hyperplan pairs it rules out. is formalism should sound pretty familiar. What
gives?
In reply, I understand condition semantics as offering an attractive framework for think-
ing about broadlymetaethical questions. Much of the formal apparatus is, on its own, neutral
on various broader philosophical issues. Certain of these issues can then be understood as
characterizing the debates over relativism and expressivism. (is is not to say that the condi-
tion semantics framework is neutral on all philosophical issues. For example, it presupposes
the substantive picture of content described in §., and rules out invariantism and contex-
tualism about moral terms.) Contemporary metaethicists can—and, if the arguments in
§§.–. are right, should—all accept condition semantics for giving their compositional
However, condition semantics is clearly unlike old-school versions of emotivism and expressivism accord-
ing to which utterances of moral sentences conventionally express non-contentful states of mind—e.g., states
expressed by some variant on ‘Boo!’ or ‘Hurray!’ anks to Matthew Chrisman for pressing me on relevant
distinctions between expressivist theories.

descriptive semantics formoral terms. Where they will differ is on certain further issues in,
e.g., philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and psychology. We can begin to delineate
the landscape of resulting metaethical positions in terms of the following sorts of questions,
among others.

What are propositions? Are they identical to—or, at least, do they determine— sets
of possible worlds, or sets of ⟨w, i⟩ pairs? Are the abstract objects that a semantics
assigns as the contents of declarative sentences and the complements of attitude verbs
the same sorts of entities that are the contents of human states of mind?

What is explanatorily fundamental in a theory of meaning? Knowledge of truth con-
ditions? Or satisfaction of norms regarding how expressions are conventionally used?
 
How should we de ne amonadic truth predicate? Is there a single moral standard that
is correct for all contexts? Or can the moral standard relevant in evaluating whether a
moral sentence is true simpliciter vary across contexts?

What makes a term normative? What is it about a linguistic community that makes it
the case that a certain term has a morality-dependent content, and that it has the par-
ticular morality-dependent content that it does? Do facts about the term’s regulative,
directive role in planning and practical reasoning play an essential role in this sort of
content-determination?

Whatmakes a particular abstract object count as the content of an agent’s attitude? Do
facts about the agent’s motivational state or emotional capacities play an essential role
in this sort of content-determination?




Are the attitudes agents bear towardmorality-dependent contents essentially practical
and action-guiding? Is there a special tie between moral judgment and action?
No doubt these questions are at least dialectically, if not logically, related. ough defenses
of answers to these questions must be reserved for elsewhere, the following clari catory re-
marks may be helpful.
ough all metaethicists can accept that moral sentences have truth conditions, in the
sense of sets of indices, whether we say they express “propositions” will depend on whether
that label is better reserved for ordinary sets of worlds or for sets of our enriched indices.
Given the theoretical roles propositions are usually thought to play—namely, of being the
contents of declarative clauses and propositional attitudes— there is little reason to preju-
dice the issue in favor of the former. However, if one has a more metaphysically robust job
description for propositions, calling perhaps for something that carves “fundamental real-
ity” (whatever that is) at its joints, one might have qualms about calling sets of ⟨w, i⟩ pairs
‘propositions’.
ough condition semantics makes use of the notion of “truth at an index,” as is stan-
dard, it can still capture our intuitive notion of truth simpliciter (in a context). According
to K (: , ), an ordinary non-normative sentence is true in a context c iff
it is true at the point of evaluation ⟨c,wc⟩, where wc is the world of c (cf. L : ).
By extension, we can say that a (moral) sentence is true—or, we might say, “correct”— in a
context c iff it is true at the point of evaluation ⟨c,wc, ic⟩, where ic is the correctmoral standard
of the context.
Note that this characterization is neutral on whether there is a single correct moral stan-
dard for all contexts. I suggest that it is by this question, the question targeted by 
, that we characterize “relativist” positions. To capture common relativist claims that
morality is not objective—or at least that moral language does not presuppose that morality
is objective— the relativist might say that a moral sentence is correct, or true in a context,
iff it is true according to the relevant moral standard of the context, where what standard
is relevant can vary across contexts. Con icting moral judgments about a particular case
may thus both be able to be correct. ose who defend the objectivity of morality—or at
least the objective purport of moral language—would deny this by de ning amonadic truth

predicate in terms of some universal moral standard.
I suggest that it is the questions in , , and  that lo-
cate many important points of contention in the debates over expressivism. Is a morality-
dependent content assigned to a term because the term plays an essentially regulative, direc-
tive role in planning or practical reasoning? Are facts about an agent’s conative, practical,
or motivational state essential in determining that some particular set of ⟨w, i⟩ pairs is the
content of her moral belief? If so, what role and which facts? (No doubt G b
will be relevant here.) ough the non-expressivist would answer these questions in the
negative, she might grant that moral beliefs are oen intimately connected with an agent’s
emotional capacities and practical attitudes, and that utterances of moral sentences can non-
conventionally express such attitudes in certain contexts. ese questions may also shed
light on the debate over judgment internalism. If having certain emotional capacities is nec-
essary for one to count as bearing the acceptance relation to a certain morality-dependent
content, this could clarify the sense in which the amoralist or sociopath may not count as
genuinely accepting any moral claims.
It is widely assumed that expressivism is committed to explaining the semantic properties
of a sentence S (e.g., inconsistencies, entailments) in terms of properties of the psychological
attitudes conventionally expressed by utterances of S, rather than in terms of properties of the
content of S. e above discussion suggests that there are positions continuous with histori-
cal versions of expressivism that reject this commitment, positions that accept the common
assumption in semantics that, at the relevant level of abstraction, semantic properties of sen-
tences are to be explained in terms of formal properties of their contents. Given the alleged
problems incurred by this commitment, as discussed in the literature on the Frege-Geach
problem, this may prove a welcome result for theorists attracted to the psychological aspects
of expressivism. (ough see S a for arguments that expressivists can still solve the
negation problem even while taking the above explanatory commitment on board.)
anks to Allan Gibbard and Jason Konek for pressing me on this issue. Depending on how one answers
 , one’s de nition of a monadic truth predicate may introduce a disanalogy between normative
and non-normative sentences: Unlike in the case of non-normative sentences, the question of which normative
sentences are true simpliciter may be a normative question. Regardless, as noted in §., one does not need to
be able to determine whether a sentence is true simpliciter in order to be semantically competent with it.
Compare “hybrid” versions of expressivism (see S  for an overview).
For arguments against treating expressivism as committed to explaining semantic properties in terms of

In these ways, a plurality of implementations of condition semantics are possible depend-
ing on one’s broader philosophical commitments. All metaethicists, I have argued, have rea-
son to accept condition semantics for moral terms in giving their compositional semantics.
And they can do so in a way that does not prejudge certain further issues concerning the
“meaning” of moral terms, broadly construed. Instead, we can locate many classic metaeth-
ical debates in certain empirical and philosophical matters in psychology, philosophy of
mind, and philosophy of language more broadly. e framework of condition semantics
suggests new ways of clarifying what is at issue in these debates.
. Conclusion
I have argued that re ection on what it is one knows when one knows what moral terms
mean motivates a “condition semantics.” Contents distinguish among possibilities. Seman-
tic competence with moral language requires, perhaps among other things, having the ca-
pacity to correctly divide the space of moral standards, or distinguish among ways things
might be morally. Just as ordinary factual sentences place conditions on possible worlds,
moral sentences place conditions on moral standards. e resulting type of analysis im-
proves upon invariantism: it’s not the case that a mere world of evaluation determines what
moral standard is relevant for the interpretation of moral terms. Condition semantics also
improves upon contextualist analyses: knowing what a moral sentence means requires being
able to correctly distinguish among moral standards, not among worlds based on whether
such-and-such relevant standard G of the context is at it is; it requires being able to pick out
the set of moral standards according to which the sentence is true, not the set of worlds in
properties of psychological attitudes, see C b: App. A. ough I have characterized expressivism
as agreeing with non-expressivism onwhat sort of descriptive semantics to adopt for normative language, there
will of course be alternative characterizations without this feature. For instance, though Gibbard’s extension of
ordinary possible worlds semantics treats sentential contents, roughly, as sets of pairs of worlds and normative
standards, an alternative, perhaps more in the spirit of Gibbard’s own non-technical discussions, is Swanson’s
(a) constraint semantics (cf. M ). is does away with worlds in the index and treats the primary
semantic values of all sentences as sets of admissible states (“constraints”)— credal states, in the case of ordi-
nary factual sentences and epistemically hedged sentences— and treats attitude ascriptions as saying that the
subject’s state satis es the constraint expressed by the complement. is is, in effect, a static version of one
kind of familiar dynamic semantics which treats the primary semantic values of sentences as relations between
information states or contexts (perhaps understood in the enriched way described in L b).

which the sentence is true according to G. e framework of condition semantics also offers
a perspicuous way of posing various classical questions inmetaethics and related areas. is,






“ ‘Ought’ and ‘Must’— they are contemptible auxiliaries.”
George Eliot†
Abstract
‘Ought’ is the philosopher’s normative term par excellence. But there has been little
inquiry on what ‘ought’, in contradistinction from other necessity modals and norma-
tive terms, actually means. I offer an analysis of the meaning of ‘ought’, and of the dis-
tinction between ‘ought’ and ‘must’, that makes correct predictions concerning a wide
range of semantic and pragmatic phenomena. ‘Ought’, on this view, expresses a kind of
conditional necessity, necessity on the supposition that the “applicability conditions”
of certain premises (norms, values, goals, etc.) are satis ed. Clarifying the distinction
between ‘ought’ and ‘must’ is not merely of linguistic interest; it can improve theorizing
on broader philosophical issues.
*anks to Brendan Dill, Irene Heim, Ezra Keshet, Dan Lassiter, Paul Portner, Bernhard Salow, Bob Stal-
naker, Eric Swanson, and audiences at SALT  and the MIT Work in Progress Seminar for helpful discussion.
A preliminary version of this chapter was published in Anca Chereches (Ed.), Semantics and Linguistic eory
, –.
†Mary Garth, in Middlemarch, Bk. , Ch. . Shamelessly modi ed from the original.

. Introduction
‘Ought’ is the philosopher’s normative term par excellence. “A primitive ought,” it has even
been said, “is the basic conceptual atom that gives normative concepts their special character”
(G : ). But there has been little inquiry on what ‘ought’ itself means. ‘Ought’,
when it is investigated at all, is typically considered merely as a representative of normative
terms more generally, effectively treated as an equivalence class. (What holds for ‘ought’
holds for…)
is is a problem. Not all normative terms are created equal. Exhibit A: Intuitively,
‘Ought ϕ’ and ‘Should ϕ’ express that ϕ is necessary in some sense. Yet it is well estab-
lished that though ‘ought’ and ‘should’ (“weak necessity modals”) are stronger than possibil-
ity modals like ‘may’ or ‘can’, they are nevertheless weaker than modals like ‘must’ and ‘have
to’ (“strong necessity modals”).
() a. I ought to (/should) help the poor. In fact, I must.
b. I must help the poor. In fact, I ought to (/should).
() a. I ought to (/should) help the poor, but I don’t have to.
b. I must help the poor, but it’s not as if I ought to (/should).
Even holding the reading of the modals xed, ‘Ought ϕ’ can be followed by ‘Must ϕ’ but
not vice versa, as re ected in (); and ‘Ought ϕ, but not must ϕ’ is consistent in a way that
‘Must ϕ, but not ought ϕ’ is not, as re ected in (). What is not well established is how
to capture this difference in strength. (In what follows I will focus on ‘ought’ and ‘must’.
Unless otherwise noted, I will not distinguish amongweak necessitymodals or among strong
necessity modals, though this is a simpli cation. Some speakers nd ‘should’ to be more
natural and less formal than ‘ought’; such speakers should feel free to substitute ‘should’ for
See, e.g., S ; H , ; W ; H , ; L ;
W ; W c; C ; J & P ; MN , ;
P , ; B  . ; G ; Z ; H & P ;
W , ; C ; W ;  F & I .
On differences among weak and strong necessity modals, respectively, see, e.g., L : ; L
b; W : –; B : –, ; L ; C : –, –,
–; B  . : –; P : , , –, –, –, , –, : ,
, H & P : , –, , –; I & Z .

‘ought’ in examples throughout this chapter.)
is might appear to be a narrowly linguistic problem. “Leave it to the semanticist,”
one might say. But such a judgment would be premature. I will argue that insensitivity to
differences amongnecessitymodals has obscured theorizing onbroader philosophical issues.
First I will motivate and develop an account of the meaning of ‘ought’ and the distinction
between weak and strong necessity modals (§.). is analysis elucidates the special role
that ‘ought’ judgments play in conversation, deliberation, and planning, and captures a wide
range of linguistic data. ough I will oen focus on deontic readings, we will see that the
proposed analysis generalizes across modal avors. Ways in which the account improves
upon its main rivals will be indicated throughout the discussion as points of contrast are
made salient. Finally, the resulting account can help us diagnose problems with arguments
on a number of further philosophical issues (§.). I will focus on three: the coherence of
moral dilemmas, the possibility of supererogatory acts, and the connection between making
a normative judgment and being motivated to act accordingly. ese diagnoses, I hope, will
motivate clearer answers and suggest new ways the dialectics may proceed.
. Weak necessity as conditional necessity
.. ‘Ought’ and ‘must’ in context
It is well appreciated that a primary goal of conversation is to share information. We express
our beliefs about the world and invite others to share in these beliefs. But we also express
other aspects of our state of mind. We coordinate our expectations, values, goals, and plans.
Sometimes we assert propositions outright. We commit to settling on the truth of our asser-
tion for the remainder of the conversation. But sometimes we don’t wish to impose such
a strong restriction on the future course of the conversation. I may want to propose that
someone is obligated to do something but be unsure about whether there might be compet-
ing norms at play that would outweigh or cancel her obligation. Or we may want to proceed
as if ‘ϕ’ is true because it follows from our evidence while remaining open to the possibility
As usual, I assume as an idealization a purely monotonic model of information gathering, i.e., that infor-
mation is only added and, once added, is not subject to further discussion.

that our evidence is misleading. I suggest that it is the role of weak necessity modals to allow
us to carry out such goals, make such proposals, and express such states of mind.
Suppose I am considering whether to ght in the Resistance or take care of my ailing
mother. I mention that the value of family, which supports my helping my mother over my
ghting, is important, and you agree. But the issue is acknowledged to be complex, and it
isn’t settled in the conversation whether there might be more important competing values.
Sensitive to this, you may nd it more appropriate to express your advice that I help my
mother by using ‘ought’ than by using ‘must’, as in (). 
() Me: Family is very important.
You: I agree. You ought to (/?must, /?have to) take care of your mother.
But if we come to settle that family is of primary importance, as in (), it can become more
natural to use ‘must’ and for us to accept that I have to help my mother.
() Me: Family is most important—more important than country.
You: I agree. You must (/have to, /?ought to) take care of your mother.
is kind of case highlights a crucial difference between weak necessity modals like
‘ought’ and strong necessity modals like ‘must’. In both () and () the value of family is
accepted in the common ground (what is mutually presupposed for the purposes of the con-
versation; S , ). How you can express your advice that I help my mother
depends on how the status of the value of family may relate to other values in the context.
In (), where it is common ground that the value of family is to take precedence, using a
strong necessity modal is preferred. But in (), where this condition isn’t settled, were you
to use ‘must’ you would imply that you are foreclosing certain possibilities that I have le
open. Unless you have the authority to do so, your using ‘must’ is dispreferred. What is illu-
minating is that you can felicitously express your advice that I help my mother using ‘ought’,
advice which I may accept, even if it isn’t common ground that the above precondition for
my having a genuine obligation to help my mother is satis ed. By using ‘ought’ you can pro-
pose that I help my mother while remaining neutral on whether the value of family might
I use ‘?’ to indicate that using the marked item is dispreferred. us ‘?’ marks a weaker infelicity than ‘’.
is is contrary to suggestions by Aynat Rubinstein (: , ; a) regarding a similar example.

be outweighed or defeated in some way. If I agree, we can plan accordingly without having
to presuppose that the value of family is more important than other competing values we
accept or may come to accept.
.. e analysis
We can make progress in capturing these points with a more nuanced understanding of the
premises that gure in the interpretation of modals. Values, norms, goals, desires, etc. typ-
ically don’t come in the form of blunt categorical imperatives or commands. ey aren’t
usually of the form No matter what, ϕ!. Rather they oen come with what I will call applica-
bility conditions (“ACs”), or conditions under which they apply. If I want to go for a run, my
desire need not be that I go for a run, come what may. More plausibly, it is that I go for a run
given that it’s sunny, that I don’t prefer to do anything else more, and so on. Our preferences
are oen conditional, preferences for certain circumstances. Similarly with moral norms.
Suppose you promised Alice that you would help her move. A norm against breaking your
promisemight be something to the effect that you help Alice unless youmade amore impor-
tant con icting promise to Bert, or keeping your promise would lead to some serious harm,
or… Norms can thus be understood on the model of conditional imperatives, imperatives
that enjoin an action or state of affairs given that certain circumstances obtain. Likewise for
goals, probabilities, and so on. is captures the intuitive idea that depending on the cir-
cumstances— i.e., depending on which applicability conditions are satis ed—only certain
norms, etc. may be “in force.” (Categorical norms, etc. can be treated as conditional on the
tautology. For ease of exposition I will tend to couch the discussion speci cally in terms of
norms, though the points generalize to other types of considerations that can determine the
reading of a modal.)
ese points can be integrated into a standard premise semantic framework for modals.
Modals are treated as receiving their reading or interpretation from a contextually supplied
set of premises. Since modals can occur in intensional contexts, it is standard to index
SeeW : ch.  andMN : ch.  for prescient discussion and related cases.
See R , b for recent emphasis of how the relative felicity of ‘ought’ and ‘must’ depends on
standing assumptions in the context. I discuss her view in my b. See also  S  . :
–,  F & I : –.
Equivalently, a preorder (L ). See especially K , , ; also  F

premise sets to a world of evaluation. Which premise set is relevant for the evaluation of
a given modal sentence can depend on how things happen to be in the actual world, or on
how things could be but aren’t or could have been but weren’t. What Little Timmy’s parents
command might change from one world to the next; thus the meaning of a phrase like ‘what
Little Timmy’s parents command’ that determines the intended reading for ‘must’ in ()
() In light of what Little Timmy’s parents command, Little Timmy must be in bed by
eight.
can be treated as a function that assigns to every possible world the set of propositions de-
scribing the house rules in that world. Similar remarks hold for the meanings of phrases like
‘in view of the relevant circumstances’, ‘according to U.S. law’, ‘in light of your goals’, and so
on. It is these functions that context is said to supply for the interpretation of modals. Call
these functions unsaturated premise sets (written ‘P’). Call the value of an unsaturated premise
set given a world of evaluation a saturated premise set—or simply a premise set (written ‘Pw’).
We can capture the role of applicability conditions in terms of variability in the values
of unsaturated premise sets at different worlds. Suppose we have a conditional imperative
‘If C, ϕ!’ which enjoins ϕ given that conditions C obtain. We can represent the content of
this conditional imperative, intuitively, with an unsaturated premise set P that assigns to
every relevant C-world a premise set that includes ϕ. For example, the normative import
of your promise to help Alice move, mentioned above, would be re ected in P’s assigning a
premise set that includes the proposition that you help Alice to worlds in which you made
this promise, you didn’t make a more important promise to Bert, etc. e premises in a
saturated premise set thus re ect what is enjoined by a body of conditional norms—or what
is preferred in light of a body of conditional preferences, what is the case in light of a body
of evidential relations, etc.— given the circumstances that obtain in the evaluation world.
ese conceptual points about the premises relative to which modal claims are inter-
preted can inform our semantics for weak and strong necessity modals. I give strong ne-
, L , V .
An alternative is to treat ACs as built into the speci cation of individual premises. Premises would be
propositions expressed by material conditionals ‘ϕ ⊃ ψ’, where ‘ϕ’ describes the AC of the action or state of
affairs described by ‘ψ’ (S b). As I argue elsewhere, however, this strategy founders in the case of the
interpretation of possibility modals like ‘may’ (S b).

cessity modals like ‘must’ their usual semantics of necessity. Bracketing some complica-
tions that won’t be relevant here, ‘Must ϕ’ says that the prejacent proposition ϕ follows from
Pw —where Pw is the premise set that is the value of the given unsaturated premise set P at
the evaluation world w. Formally:
 
‘Must ϕ’ is true at w iff ⋂Pw ⊆ JϕK
e truth of ‘Must ϕ’ thus depends on the value of P at the world of evaluation. In order for
‘Must ϕ’ to be true at w, given an unsaturated premise set P, the circumstances in w must be
such that the premise set Pw veri es the necessity of ϕ.
e same doesn’t hold for ‘ought’. What makes weak necessity modals “weak,” I suggest,
is that they express a kind of conditional necessity, necessity on the supposition that certain
conditions, the applicability conditions of certain relevant premises, are satis ed. Roughly,
‘Ought ϕ’ is true iff ‘Must ϕ’ would be true were it to turn out that certain relevant norms,
values, goals, etc. that bear on the necessity of ϕ are in force and not defeated. ‘Ought ϕ’
makes a claim about the necessity of ϕ at all closest relevant χ-worlds, for some contextually
supplied condition χ. More formally, where s is a selection function that selects a set of
closest χ-worlds to the evaluation world w:
 
‘Oughtϕ’ is true atw iff ‘Mustϕ’ is true at all worldsw′ ∈ s(w, χ) iff∀w′ ∈ s(w, χ)∶⋂Pw′ ⊆ JϕK
(is will be re ned in §..; more on the condition χ shortly.) In making an ‘ought’ claim
one need not commit to being in a world w such that Pw veri es the necessity of ϕ.
For simplicity I assume that our premise sets are consistent, and I do not distinguish between Kratzer’s
modal bases and ordering sources. Dropping these assumptions, the simpli ed talk in the main text about
what follows from Pw can be understood as short for talk about what follows from all maximally consistent
subsets of Fw ∪ Gw that include Fw as a subset, where Fw is a modal base that describes some set of relevant
background facts and Gw is an ordering source that represents the content of a relevant ideal at the evaluation
world. (is still makes the limit assumption (L : –), the assumption that ordering consistent
subsets of Fw ∪ Gw that include Fw by set inclusion ⊆ yields a set of subsets that are ⊆-maximal. For semantics
without the limit assumption, see L ; K , ; S .) I also assume that the
prejacents of modals express propositions conceived as sets of possible worlds.
For precedents in descriptive linguistics, see P : –, , ; : , –. Inmy b:
– and b I argue that thinking of premise sets in terms of applicability conditions can also help solve
the problem of capturing weights and priorities among premises in premise sets.

e truth-conditional difference between weak and strong necessity modals highlighted
in   and   is certainly not the only difference among weak
and strong necessity modals, a point we will return to in §... However, as we will see in
the remainder of this section, this account of the weak/strong necessity distinction can go a
long way in explaining various properties of weak and strong necessity modals.
Treating weak necessity modals as conditional in the way described above helps capture
how they are well suited to play the sort of role in conversation, thought, and planning dis-
cussed in §... In saying ‘Must ϕ’, you assume a body of relevant circumstances and norms
(values, goals, etc.), and assert that ϕ is necessary relative to what the norms enjoin given
those circumstances. So, in order for ‘Must ϕ’ to be accepted in a context, and thus true at
all worlds in the context set (the set of live possibilities, the set of worlds compatible with the
common ground), the context set must be restricted to worlds in which the relevant applica-
bility conditions are satis ed, i.e., to worlds w such that Pw entails ϕ. But sometimes placing
such a strong constraint on the development of the conversation would be inapt. Perhaps we
want to coordinate on the necessity of ϕ without having to restrict the future development
of the conversation in such a way that decisively settles on the truth of certain ACs, or that
presupposes that certain relevant premises are in force and not defeated. We can do so using
a weak necessity modal. In uttering ‘Ought ϕ’ one needn’t assume that the circumstances
in the world are such that what the relevant norms enjoin given those circumstances entails
ϕ; one needn’t commit to being in a world w such that Pw entails ϕ. Rather, one expresses
one’s commitment to the necessity of ϕ on some implicit condition or other, and invites one’s
interlocutors to test whether this same property holds of their states of mind. If it does, then
the group can proceed as if ϕ is necessary without having to presuppose that there aren’t any
more important competing considerations and while remaining open to new evidence.
Returning to ()–(), reproduced below, the deontic necessity of my helping my mother
depends on the value of family being more important in my situation than other potentially
competing values.
() Me: Family is very important.
You: I agree. You ought to (/?must, /?have to) take care of your mother.
() Me: Family is most important—more important than country.

You: I agree. You must (/have to, /?ought to) take care of your mother.
In (), when my assertion is accepted this condition that the value of family is to take prece-
dence becomes common ground; the AC for my helping my mother is satis ed throughout
the context set. So, the context set gets restricted toworldsw such that Pw includes the propo-
sition that I help my mother, and your ‘must’ claim is true throughout the context set. Since
using ‘must’ is felicitous in this context, using the weaker ‘ought’ would violate a Gricean
quantity maxim and so is dispreferred. (I return to the precise sense in which ‘ought’ is
weaker in §...) In (), by contrast, aer my assertion is accepted it is still not common
ground that the AC for my helping my mother is satis ed—hence the hesitancy one might
feel in using ‘must’. But since ‘Ought ϕ’ can be accepted in a conversation even if not all
worlds w in the context set are such that Pw entails ϕ, your ‘ought’ claim is still felicitous and
acceptable. By accepting your ‘ought’ claim, we can provisionally proceed as if my helping
my mother is required without needing to settle that the value of family isn’t outweighed or
defeated in some way.
I have said that ‘ought’ is preferred in (), but it is important to see that in certain contexts
‘must’ may also be acceptable. A speaker may felicitously use ‘must’ in a context in which
it isn’t common ground whether certain relevant applicability conditions are satis ed if she
can be presumed to be a legitimate authority on them and can thus make them common
ground by her utterance. is is a familiar kind of accommodation (L b, S-
 ). In (), if you can be presumed a normative authority on the issue in question,
I will accommodate in response to your using ‘must’ by accepting the assumption required
for your ‘must’ claim to be true, namely, that we are in a world w such that Pw includes the
proposition that I help my mother.
is is not an isolated example. Suppose Alice, a young teenager, wants to go to Harlem
and is considering with hermother, Martha, whether to take the A train or the C train. eA
train is quicker, but theC train is safer. Martha takes the safety of her child to be of paramount
importance, though this value is not common ground between them. Nevertheless Martha
can felicitously say to Alice:
() You must take the C train, not the A train.

By uttering ()Martha expresses her acceptance that the goal of traveling safely takes priority
over the goal of traveling quickly. Given her authority in the context, she can legitimately
expect Alice to share this acceptance and accommodate. is renders it common ground
that the applicability condition of the former but not the latter goal is satis ed, and restricts
the context set to worlds that verify the necessity of ϕ. But such special contexts notwith-
standing—contexts in which the speaker does not have or does not wish to exercise this
authority— ‘ought’ will be preferred.
Before moving on, a brief word about the implicit condition χ that gures in the in-
terpretation of ‘ought’ is in order. Using ‘ought’ allows us to coordinate on some action’s
being required without having to settle de nitively that all the norms that render that action
required apply and are not defeated. Given this role for ‘ought’ in an utterance of ‘Ought
ϕ’, and given plausible conversational maxims—especially, that given a set of alternative
propositions a speaker asserts the proposition she thinks is most likely to remain accepted
throughout the evolution of the conversation—χ will be some condition such that there is
no alternative condition with respect to which ‘Ought ψ’ would be true that is (presumed to
be) at least as likely or desirable as χ, for contraries ‘ϕ’ and ‘ψ’. ere may be independent
reasons for building this subjective element into the semantics for ‘ought’, but this compli-
cation is not necessary for present purposes. We can derive it pragmatically. Upon hearing
an utterance of ‘Ought ϕ’ a hearer might reason as follows:
() “S said ‘Ought ϕ’. So S must think there is some relevant condition C given which
‘Must ϕ’ would be true. If S thought there was another more probable or desirable
condition C′ given which ‘Must ψ’ would be true (for contraries ‘ϕ’ and ‘ψ’), she
would think it more likely or desirable that ‘Must ψ’ is true and accepted than ‘Must
ϕ’. So Swould have said ‘Oughtψ’, assuming that she is being cooperative and obey-
ing the maxims. But S didn’t say ‘Ought ψ’. So she must think C is not less likely




ough we have been focusing on deontic readings, the proposed analysis generalizes across
modal avors, even to epistemic modals. Like with norms and goals, what is expected given
certain evidence can be conditional, conditional on things being normal in the relevant re-
spects. Suppose Alice is coming to visit and her ight was due to arrive een minutes ago.
LetwN be a world in which conditions are normal in the relevant respects, andwN be a world
in which conditions are not normal in these respects. For instance, in wN Alice leaves her
house on time, traffic conditions are thus-and-so, her ight isn’t delayed, pirates don’t kidnap
her, and so on. e evidential import of these conditions can be re ected in the unsaturated
premise set P’s assigning wN a premise set that includes the proposition A that Alice arrives
by such-and-such time t, and assigning wN a premise set that includes ¬A. Relative to this
unsaturated premise set, A is only an epistemic necessity at worlds like wN in which condi-
tions are normal. So in order for A to be accepted as epistemically necessary, the context set
must be restricted to normal worlds like wN.
Consider the dialogues in ()–().
() Me: Alice must have arrived by now.
You: Really? But what if she got into a car accident on the way to the airport, or
her ight got delayed, or the plane needed to circle?
Me: Oh, I hadn’t thought of that. (/I was assuming otherwise.)
() Me: Alice ought to have arrived by now.
You: But what if she got into a car accident on the way to the airport, or her ight
got delayed, or the plane needed to circle?
Me: I know; that’s why I said ought!
As in the case of Martha and Alice in (), your utterance in () is felicitous only if you have
the epistemic authority to make me accommodate and make it common ground by your
utterance that conditions are normal. If you don’t have this authority, I may reasonably raise
to salience certain live possibilities that are incompatible with the epistemic necessity of A.
But if I use ‘ought’, as in (), your mentioning such possibilities may be beside the point,
for I am not committing to conditions being normal. I am making an implicitly conditional

claim about what would be necessary were it to turn out that conditions are normal. As in the
deontic case, ‘must’ is preferred if I can reasonably treat the relevant applicability conditions
as settled, and ‘ought’ is preferred if I cannot. We can provide a uniform explanation for the
behavior of weak and strong necessity modals in their various readings.
.. Counterfactual marking
e proposed analyses capture a wide range of further linguistic phenomena involving weak
and strong necessity modals. One example which I nd especially compelling concerns how
weak necessity is expressed cross-linguistically. In this section and the next I will argue that
the way in which the proposed account can capture the cross-linguistic data also helps ex-
plain various seemingly unrelated semantic and pragmatic properties of ‘ought’ and ‘must’.
Past tense forms of modals— in English, ‘would’ for ‘will’, ‘could’ for ‘can’, ‘might’ for
‘may’— are oen used not to indicate past time reference, but to express tentativeness or
politeness and weaken the force of the modality, as in ()–(). ey are also the forms that
appear in the consequents of subjunctive conditionals, as in ().
() a. Alice will (/may, /can’t) be at home now.
b. Alice would (/might, /couldn’t) be at home now.
() a. May (/Can) I comment on your proposal?
b. Might (/Could) I comment on your proposal?
() If you took the : ight tomorrow, you would (/could, /might) get there by :.
P  dubs these uses of past tense “the modal past.”
Strikingly, ‘ought’ patterns with the past-marked modal forms. First, as we have seen,
‘ought’ weakens the necessity of ‘must’. Second, ‘ought’, unlike ‘must’, can appear in subjunc-
tive conditional consequents, as in ().
() a. If Alice came to the party tomorrow, Bert ought to leave.
b. If Alice came to the party tomorrow, Bert must(ed) leave.
See also, e.g., J , L , C , P , P , , F
, I , H & P . Terminology varies among authors.

ird, when used with nonpast time reference, ‘ought’, unlike ‘must’, patterns with the past-
marked forms in being non-entailing; ‘Ought ϕ’, unlike ‘Must ϕ’, is compatible with ‘¬ϕ’. (We
will return to this point in §...)
() a. Alice ought to be here by now, but she isn’t.
b. Alice must be here by now, but she isn’t.
() I could give to Oxfam, but I won’t.
Fourth, when used with the perfect, ‘ought’ patterns with the past-marked forms in impli-
cating the negation of its prejacent.
() I could have given to Oxfam. (Implicates: I didn’t)
() a. We ought to have given to Oxfam. (Implicates: we didn’t)
b. We must have given to Oxfam (but we didn’t).
‘Must’ cannot even receive a deontic reading when used with past time reference. ‘Ought’,
but not ‘must’, can be used to communicate that a certain obligation held in the past. is
follows from the more general point that only past-marked forms can take scope under the
perfect (C ). Suppose we know that Alice lost the race, but we are discussing
alternative ways things could have gone. We can use the past-marked form ‘might’ but not
‘may’ to express that aer the rst lap it was still (circumstantially, metaphysically) possible
for Alice to win.
() a. Aer the rst lap, Alice (still) might have won.
√
perf > might
b. Aer the rst lap, Alice (still) may have won. *perf > may
at ‘ought’ can take scope under the perfect in (a) is a h respect in which ‘ought’ pat-
terns with past-markedmodal forms. In sum, though ‘must’ does not have a past tense form,
‘ought’ appears to function semantically as its modal past.
ese data are surprising given the fact about English that the distinction between weak
Cf. A : ; P : –, , –; : , –, , –. Formally,
‘should’ is the past tense formof ‘shall’. But ‘should’ with this quasi-subjunctivemeaning is distinct from ‘should’
in its expressing weak necessity (cf. n. ). I am not distinguishing typographically between word forms and
lexical items; context should disambiguate.

and strong necessity is marked with different words. But they become less surprising when
we examine other languages. e cross-linguistic norm is to mark the semantic distinction
between weak and strong necessity morphologically. Weak necessity is typically expressed
using the formal modal past of a strong necessity modal, or by combining a strong necessity
modal with counterfactual morphology—e.g., with some kind of fake past-tense marking
(past-tense marking that receives a nonpast interpretation).
Von Fintel and Iatridou (, ) attempt to capture this cross-linguistic data in their
semantics for ‘ought’. ey treat weak necessity modals as quantifying over “the best of the
best” worlds— roughly, the relevant Pw-compatible worlds that are also compatible with cer-
tain further considerations, represented by a secondary ordering source (premise set that
represents the content of some ideal; see n. ). (is can be understood as formalizing
the not uncommon informal claim that “Ought is related to must as best is related to only”
(W c: )— i.e., that ‘Ought ϕ’ implies that ϕ is best among various accept-
able alternatives, whereas ‘Must ϕ’ implies that ϕ is the only acceptable alternative; see also,
e.g., S , MN .) It is speculated that “the counterfactual marking is
co-opted here in a somewhat meta-linguistic kind of way: ‘if we were in a context in which
the secondary ordering source was promoted [to primary status], then it would be a strong
necessity that…’ ” (: ). e tentativeness associated with the counterfactual marking
is attributed to the fact that the premises in the secondary ordering source need not apply:
“e choice of whether to really promote the secondary ordering source is le open” (:
).
I nd this analysis unsatisfying. First, little is said about what makes a primary ordering
source “primary” and a secondary ordering source “secondary” apart from the fact that the
latter gures only in the interpretation of weak necessitymodals. No story is given about how
primary and secondary ordering sources are determined independently of the truth condi-
See esp. P : , , , –, –;  F & I ; cf. V L
& V . Interestingly, the marker for weak necessity in Central Pomo is also a conditional marker
(P : ). As von Fintel and Iatridou note (n.), English ‘ought’ ts this pattern historically;
it was formerly the past subjunctive of the verb ‘owe’ (see also C : ; B : ). For
discussion of how counterfactuality is marked cross-linguistically, and of what are the essential grammatical
components, if any, of counterfactualmarking, see J ; F; D ; I,
; P ; V L&V ; R&W ; B ; B
& H .

tions of the relevant ‘ought’ and ‘must’ sentences. We should be able to say what the primary
and secondary ordering sources are in various contexts without simply reverse engineering
them from relevant truth value judgments. Second, absent an account of what makes it the
case about a speaker that she is counterfactually promoting a secondary ordering source, the
proposed story about the role of the counterfactual marking seems ad hoc. ird, one might
worry that the proposed explanation for the tentativeness associated with the counterfactual
morphology just redescribes what needs to be explained. e tentativeness is “explained”
by positing a parameter consisting of premises that need not apply. Fourth, it is unclear
how their explanation would generalize to explain the tentativeness associated with coun-
terfactual morphology on other kinds of lexical items—e.g., possibility modals like ‘might’,
or desire verbs like ‘wish’, which, as von Fintel and Iatridou themselves note, are expressed
in many languages by placing counterfactual morphology on the word for ‘want’ (see also
I ).
I have said that weak necessity modal claims are claims about what would be necessary
were it to turn out that certain applicability conditions are satis ed. Treating weak necessity
as conditional necessity in this way suggests a more natural explanation of the data. We
can capture the cross-linguistic data by taking our cue from independent theories of the
semantic and pragmatic role of counterfactual marking. e details of what this role is and
how it is determined are not uncontroversial. But it is generally agreed that counterfactual
morphology signals that the worlds being talked about needn’t be candidates for actuality,
or that the set of topic worlds isn’t a subset of the context set (S ,  F
, I , B ). We can incorporate this element into our analysis of
weak necessity modals by supplementing the truth conditions in   with a
pragmatic constraint on the selection function s that the set of selectedworlds not be included
in the context set c.
() Pragmatic constraint: s(w, χ) ⊈ c
is requires that at least some of the worlds at which the necessity of the prejacent is eval-
uated be outside the context set. Given the truth-conditions in   and the
pragmatic constraint in (), it is unsurprising that many languages should use a modal past
form of a strong necessity modal to express weak necessity, and that English should be the

anomaly in using a different modal verb.
Treating ‘ought’ semantically as the modal past of ‘must’ in this way explains why ‘ought’
should pattern with the past modal forms in the ways described above. It also gives precise
expression to the intuition that ‘ought’ is weaker and more tentative than ‘must’. In uttering
‘Ought ϕ’ the speaker makes a claim about the necessity of ϕ and marks her utterance as
being about a set of worlds that needn’t be candidates for actuality. But, as Stalnaker notes,
“normally a speaker is concerned only with possible worlds within the context set, since this
set is de ned as the set of possible worlds among which the speaker wishes to distinguish”
(: ). So, using ‘ought’ implicates that one isn’t in a position to make a claim about
whether the prejacent is necessary throughout the set of live possibilities. Interestingly, this
suggests that the basis of the scale between ‘ought’ and ‘must’ is not one of quanti cation but
of epistemic strength. We can assimilate the tentativeness of ‘ought’ to the tentativeness of
past forms more generally, as in non-counterfactual subjunctive conditionals— sometimes
called “future less vivid” conditionals— like () above and ().
() If you came to our party tomorrow—and I’m not saying that you will— you would
have a great time.
In such examples, the speaker may simply wish to admit the possibility that it could become
taken for granted that themarked clause is not true. is is what happenswith ‘ought’ regard-
ing the relevant applicability conditions (and, as we will see in §.., the modal’s prejacent
as well).
is explanation of the relative tentativeness associating with using ‘ought’ also helps
explain our initial data from ()–(), reproduced below.
() a. I ought to help the poor. In fact, I must.
b. I must help the poor. In fact, I ought to.
() a. I ought to help the poor, but I don’t have to.
b. I must help the poor, but it’s not as if I ought to.
Since ‘ought’ is weaker than ‘must’, Grice’s rst quantity maxim—“Make your contribution
Cf. Z  and V L & V  on counterfactual clauses.
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as informative as is required” (G : )— can be exploited to generate a familiar
upper-bounding implicature, namely, from the use of ‘ought’ that for all one knows—or,
better, for all one is willing to presuppose in the conversation— ‘Must ϕ’ is false. is
scalar implicature has the usual properties of implicatures. It is cancelable and reinforceable,
as in (a) and (a), respectively. And it is suspendable, as in ().
() I ought to help the poor. Maybe I have to.
In the case of (a), for example, the speaker rst conveys that the set of worlds being talked
about isn’t included in the set of live possibilities and then asserts that what holds in the
former worlds— the deontic necessity of the proposition that I help the poor—also holds
in the latter worlds. e implicature data with ‘ought’ can thus be treated analogously to the
implicature data with subjunctive conditionals.
() a. If you had the u, you would have exactly the symptoms you have now. (cf.
A : )
b. If you had the u, you would have very different symptoms from the symptoms
you have now.
c. If you had the u, you would be sick. Maybe you do have the u; you are pretty
congested.
Before moving on, I would like to address two concerns with the proposed way of cap-
turing the counterfactual element in weak necessity modals. First, on my account, ‘ought’
makes a claim about what is necessary at certain worlds outside the context set. is might
seem to predict that ‘Must ϕ’ and ‘Ought ¬ϕ’ are consistent: Given an unsaturated premise
set P, there is nothing inconsistent with ϕ following from Pw and ¬ϕ following from Pw′ , for
all w′ ∈ s(w, χ) and some χ that is false at w. But this prediction seems incorrect; () is
contradictory.
() I must give more to the poor, but I shouldn’t.
See, e.g., H , ; G ; G . Oen in scalar implicatures hearers are also
licensed in taking the so-called “epistemic step” from ‘It’s not the case that S believes ϕ’ to ‘S believes ¬ϕ’. is
stronger implicature will not be relevant in what follows.
A simple model: Let W = {w,w′},Pw = {ϕ},Pw′ = {¬ϕ},w ∉ χ,w′ ∈ χ, and s(w, χ) = {w′}.

If ‘Must ϕ’ is true, ‘Ought ¬ϕ’ must be false.
As the reinforcability data in (a) shows, it is felicitous and consistent to predicate the
necessity of ϕ of a set of worlds at least some of which are outside the context set, while also
denying that ϕ is necessary at all worlds in the context set. But our treatment of the pragmat-
ics of ‘ought’ claims con rms that it should be anomalous to predicate the necessity of ϕ of
certain worlds outside the context set when one is in a position to predicate the necessity of
¬ϕ of all worlds in the context set. Given the role that necessity claims play in guiding action,
deliberation, and expectations, it would be counter to one’s discourse- and non-discourse-
related goals to utter ‘Ought ¬ϕ’ while also proposing to coordinate on the necessity of ϕ. As
discussed in §.., given a set of relevant considerations that bear on the necessity of ϕ, the
worlds of which ¬ϕ is predicated to be necessary in an utterance of ‘Ought ¬ϕ’ are, roughly,
those worlds compatible with the applicability conditions that the speaker most endorses in
some relevant sense. If the speaker successfully asserts ‘Must ϕ’, some of these worlds will be
in the context set. is correctly predicts that if ‘Must ϕ’ is felicitous and true, ‘Ought ¬ϕ’ is
false. One cannot accept both ‘Must ϕ’ and ‘Ought ¬ϕ’.
Second, I have argued that ‘Ought ϕ’ says that ‘Must ϕ’ is true at certain possibly coun-
terfactual worlds. Von Fintel and Iatridou object that this sort of view incorrectly predicts
that ‘ought’ is semantically equivalent to ‘would have to’ (: –). In ()–(), ‘ought’
cannot be replaced by ‘would have to’.
() a. I ought to help the poor. In fact, I must.
b. ?I would have to help the poor. In fact, I must.
() a. I ought to help the poor, but I don’t have to.
b. ?I would have to help the poor, but I don’t have to.
Similarly, (a) is not equivalent to (b) (their () and ()).
() a. (If Fred wanted to get to the island) he would have to use this boat.
b. He ought to use this boat.
e worry is that “[t]he string would have to talks about a necessity that obtains in a counter-
factual world. In the actual world, there is no modal advice, suggestion or obligation… On

the other hand, when we use ought, the modal’s force holds in the actual world” (: ).
Languages thatmark theweak/strong necessity distinctionmorphologically use the same
string to express ‘ought’ and ‘would have to’. Given considerations of compositionality, it
would be preferable, other things equal, to give these strings the same semantic interpreta-
tion. e account in this chapter, unlike the one in  F & I , has this
advantage. Expressions of weak necessity are given precisely the semantics we would expect
given their lexical and morphological features across languages. Even so, we can still capture
the apparent differences between ‘ought’ and ‘would have to’ sentences.
‘Ought’ allows us to talk about what is necessary in certain worlds outside the context
set without having to make explicit a condition that determines a speci c set of worlds in
which the necessity claim is said to hold. is need not render ‘ought’ claims hopelessly
vague, however. Given pragmatic principles like those discussed in §.. and in this section,
hearers can retrieve a plausible range of conditions that speakers assume to be most likely or
desirable when making ‘ought’ claims. If a hearer accepts a speaker’s assertion of ‘Ought ϕ’,
she expresses that there is also some condition that she takes to be most likely or desirable
given which ϕ is necessary— this even if speaker and hearer are not explicit about what this
condition is. is carves out two crucial features of ‘ought’ claims in conversation, features
which distinguish them from ‘would have to’ claims.
First, conversational participants can all accept ‘Oughtϕ’ and coordinate on the necessity
ofϕwithout having tomake explicit and agree upon a speci c condition givenwhichϕwould
be necessary. is marks a contrast in the anaphoric properties of ‘ought’ and ‘would have
to’. Whereas ‘ought’ is acceptable even if no particular condition is salient, as in (a), ‘would
have to’ is not, as in (b). e condition that gures in a ‘would have to’ claim must be
readily retrievable by the addressee; it must be salient in the extra-linguistic context, as in
(), or in the linguistic context, as in ().
() [Context: We are strangers standing in a hotel lobby. I notice you fumbling with
your bags.]
a. Here, I should help you.
b. ?Here, I would have to help you.
() [Context: We are trying out electric guitars in a music store. We come across a very

expensive vintage Gibson Les Paul.]
I would have to check with my wife rst.
() a. If I really wanted to buy this guitar, I would have to check with my wife rst.
b. I could buy this guitar. But I would have to check with my wife rst.
Second, by asserting ‘Ought ϕ’ speakers exert conversational pressure on hearers to presup-
pose that there is some condition that is most likely or desirable given which ϕ is necessary.
By contrast, one can accept that ϕ is necessary given ψ, for some possibly counterfactual
condition ψ, without thinking that ψ is the most likely or desirable condition that bears on
whether ϕ is necessary. is contrast is re ected in ()–(); the (a)-examples are true, but
the (b)-examples are false.
() a. If I was a mobster, which I’m not, I would have to kill you.
b. I ought to kill you.
() [Context: I don’t know whether Alice will come to my wedding next month. As a
matter of fact, unbeknownst to me, she won’t end up coming.]
a. If Alice came tomy wedding next month, I would have to send her a thank you
card.
b. I ought to send Alice a thank you card.
is predicts that if we make explicit a condition that is mutually endorsed in the conversa-
tion, the effects of a ‘would have to’ claim should be closer to those of an ‘ought’ claim. is
prediction appears to be borne out.
() a. Alice le an hour ago. If there wasn’t any traffic and everything was normal,
she would have to be at her office by now. In fact, I checked and there wasn’t
any traffic and everything was normal. So she must be at her office by now.
b. Alice le an hour ago. She ought to be at her office by now. In fact, I checked,
and there wasn’t any traffic and everything was normal. So she must be at her
office by now.
() [Context (see ()): Alice wants to go to Harlem and is considering with her mother,

Martha, whether to take the A or the C train. e A train is quicker, but the C train
is safer. Martha says:]
a. If safety was most important, you would have to take the C train. In fact, safety
is more important, as we can agree. So you have to take the C train.
b. You ought to take the C train. In fact, safety is most important, as we can agree.
So you have to take the C train.
In these ways, although ‘ought’ claims are claims about what is necessary in certain possibly
counterfactual worlds, they differ from explicit counterfactuals with necessity modals. We
can capture the sense in which weak necessity modal claims can bear on what is necessary
in (what is presumed to be) the actual world.
.. Entailingness and performativity
By treating ‘ought’ semantically as the modal past of ‘must’ and building a conditional ele-
ment into its meaning, we can also explain several seemingly unrelated puzzles concerning
entailingness and performativity with ‘ought’ and ‘must’.
First, thoughmany authors have claimed that ‘Oughtϕ’ on its epistemic reading expresses
that ϕ is probable, the data strongly suggests that ‘ought’ is unlike ‘must’ in this respect.
‘Must ϕ’ commits the speaker to a high unconditional credence in ϕ, whereas ‘Ought ϕ’ does
not commit the speaker to any unconditional credence inϕ (cf. S a). Reconsider
(), reproduced below.
() a. Alice ought to be here by now, but she isn’t.
b. Alice must be here by now, but she isn’t.
Epistemic ‘Must ϕ, but ¬ϕ’ is inconsistent in a way that epistemic ‘Ought ϕ, but ¬ϕ’ is not.
E.g., S ; H ; W ; F ; L .
e felicity of epistemic ‘Ought ϕ, but ¬ϕ’ does not threaten our claim that ‘Ought ϕ’ expresses the
speaker’s presumption that there is no condition χ—no set of relevant ACs— that is at least as probable as
ones given which ϕ is necessary. e condition χ that is supposed true in the interpretation of epistemic
‘ought’ must be live at least in the sense that one does not have evidence from one’s direct experience that it
is false. As long as one would have expected that χ was satis ed were it not for one’s indirect evidence that
it is false, one can still utter ‘Ought ϕ’. Support for this comes from the fact that it is preferred for denials of
the relevant ACs to be headed by epistemic ‘must’, which, it is widely acknowledged, typically signals that its

Surprisingly, this appears to hold for deontic readings as well.
() a. You ought to help your mother, but you won’t (/but I know you won’t).
b. You must help your mother, but you won’t (/but I know you won’t).
Of course obligations can go unful lled. What is interesting is that speakers appear to assume
otherwise, at least for the purposes of conversation, when expressing obligations with ‘must’.
I follow S ,  F , and B , among others, in think-
ing that there is a default presupposition that a modal’s domain of quanti cation is a subset
of the context set— a default canceled by the subjunctive, or counterfactual markers more
generally. is predicts straightaway that (b) and (b) are inconsistent. Since ‘must’ does
not have a counterfactual element to its meaning, the context set must include ⋂Pw, for all
worlds w in the context set. So, if ‘Must ϕ’ is accepted, ¬ϕ cannot be satis ed throughout the
context set; hence the inconsistency of ‘Must ϕ, but ¬ϕ’. However, there is no similar restric-
tion on the value of the unsaturated premise set P at worlds outside the context set; the value
of P at non-live possibilities needn’t be compatible with the common ground. Since ‘ought’
takes us to worlds outside the context set in assessing the necessity of its prejacent, as long as
all worlds w′ ∈ s(w, χ) are outside the context set, ‘Ought ϕ’ can be true at a live possibility w
even if all the worlds in the context set are ¬ϕ-worlds; hence the consistency of ‘Ought ϕ, but
¬ϕ’. So, even if S (a: –) is right that “pure premise semantics on its own”
cannot capture the above data, the analyses of ‘ought’ and ‘must’ in §.., conjoined with
independently motivated pragmatic constraints on mood and the interpretation of modals,
suggest a natural explanation.
prejacent is the conclusion of an indirect inference (see, amongmany others, K : -; C
: , , –, , ; : –;  F & G ).
(i) She ought to be here by now, but she isn’t. Something must have (/?has) gone wrong!
See esp. W : – and ; N ; P : , –. See also L
, L , W , H , L , W c, C , P
, , H & P , S a.
is is of course not the only possible explanation for the data in () and (). S a captures
the data by including in the semantic entry for ‘must’ but not ‘ought’ a constraint that requires high credence
in the modal’s prejacent. It would be better, I take it, if we could explain the data in terms of independent
features of the semantics of ‘ought’ and ‘must’, as I have argued we can. Alternatively, one might explain the
data by appealing to the different performative properties of weak and strong necessity modals (N ;
S : –; P : , –). I argue below that the analysis in the main text has

Onemight worry that our explanation of the inconsistency of (b) does not also predict
the inconsistency of ().
() ?You must go to confession, but I’m not sure if you will (/but you might not).
We predicted that if ‘Must ϕ’ is true, ‘¬ϕ’ cannot be true throughout the context set. is
would seem to leave open whether it might be true at some worlds in the context set. In
reply, I am not sure that () is inconsistent; at minimum, it sounds better than (b). But if
we grant that it is at least anomalous, one option is to say that this is because of a pragmatic
norm that interlocutors do what they can to make the actual world be among the best worlds
(cf. P : ). () would then be pragmatically anomalous to the extent that
it is anomalous to commit someone to help see to it that ϕ while expressly admitting the
possibility of ¬ϕ. is is not full-blown inconsistency, of course, but that seems like the
correct prediction for this case.
Deontic ‘ought’ and ‘must’ are oen thought to differ in their conventional force. At least
in root clauses, deontic ‘must’, unlike deontic ‘ought’, is oen thought to have a performative
or imperative-like aspect to its conventional meaning; it is oen thought to conventionally
perform a directive speech act, or be used to try to get someone (possibly oneself) to do
something, perhaps in addition to performing an assertion. Some have appealed to this
performative property of deontic ‘must’ as motivation for a dynamic semantics. ough a
dynamic implementationmight be desirable on other grounds, our explanations for () and
() suggest an alternative static explanation. Since accepting ‘Must ϕ’ is incompatible with
denying ‘ϕ’, if the truth of ‘ϕ’ is assumed to be under the control of some relevant subject,
updating with ‘Must ϕ’ will commit the subject of the obligation to seeing to it that ϕ. So, it is
no surprise that ‘must’ should be thought to be conventionally directive. But since accepting
‘Ought ϕ’ is compatible with denying ‘ϕ’, updating with ‘Ought ϕ’ needn’t commit anyone to
seeing to it that ϕ. So, we correctly predict that even if deontic ‘ought’ can be used to perform
a directive speech act, it doesn’t do so as a matter of its conventional meaning. (ough
‘ought’ is not conventionally directive, it should come as no surprise, given the discussion
the advantage of explaining these performative properties as well, without needing to take them as basic.
See especially N ; P : –, : –, –; S :
–. Cf. B , L , , L , L a,W , C , P
, B  . , H & P , N  . .

in §§..–.. of the conversational role of ‘ought’ claims and the implicit condition χ,
that deontic ‘ought’ claims are still oen thought to perform more moderate speech acts of
recommending or advising.)
. A little philosophical therapy
us concludes our whirlwind tour of various linguistic advantages of understanding weak
necessity as conditional necessity. ‘Ought’, I have argued, expresses a kind of conditional
necessity, necessity on the supposition that the applicability conditions of certain norms,
values, goals, etc. are satis ed. ewide range of semantic andpragmatic phenomena that are
predicted and explained by our analysis lend it a robust base of support. But as interesting as
our linguistic ruminations have been—no presupposition failure I hope!— the distinction
between ‘ought’ and ‘must’ is notmerely of interest to the philosopher of language or linguist.
Greater sensitivity to differences among necessitymodals can improve theorizing on broader
philosophical issues. I will brie y discuss three such issues in normative and metanormative
theory: moral dilemmas, supererogation, and judgment internalism.
.. Moral dilemmas
Suppose you promised Alice that you will help her move and promised Bert that you will
help him move, but you discover that you cannot help them both. Suppose also that each
promise is uniquely important and that there is no higher-order principle you can use to
resolve whom to help. On the face of it, you are in a moral dilemma. But some have argued
that genuine moral dilemmas are impossible.
On the one hand, it is not uncommon for arguments against the existence ofmoral dilem-
mas to be motivated by the thought that it is inconsistent for contrary acts to be simultane-
ously required. It would seem inconsistent for you to be required to help Alice and required
to help Bert when you cannot help them both. Morality, the thought goes, could never land
In my a I apply these explanations of the contrasting discourse properties of ‘ought’ and ‘must’ to
the case of the Miners Puzzle, and argue that they elucidate previously unnoticed contrasts in information-
sensitivity among deontic conditionals with ‘ought’, ‘must’, and ‘may’.

us in such a genuine contradiction. Here are Kant and Alan Donagan:
But since duty and obligation are concepts that express the objective practical
necessity of certain actions and two rules opposed to each other cannot be nec-
essary at the same time, if it is a duty to act in accordance with one rule, to act in
accordance with the opposite rule is not a duty but even contrary to duty; so a
collision of duties and obligations is inconceivable (obligationes non colliduntur).
(K : :)
Rationalist theories cannot allow moral dilemmas… Each principle and each
derivative proposition of a rationalist theory asserts, of some rule or precept
that it assumes all human beings can observe in all situations to which that rule
or precept applies, that practical reason requires them all to observe it. If, there-
fore, any such theory were to assert that practical reason requires any human
being in any situation to observe a set of precepts that cannot all be observed
in it, it would contradict itself; for it would assert that set of precepts not to be
what it also asserts or assumes them to be. (D : )
On the other hand, there is a long tradition in ethics and logic that is compelled by the
thought that it is at least coherent to think that ‘Ought ϕ’ and ‘Ought ψ’ might both be true,
for contraries ‘ϕ’ and ‘ψ’. Even if, fortuitously, there are no moral dilemmas, it is plausible
that the possibility of moral dilemmas should not be ruled out simply by the meaning of
‘ought’. is intuition is bolstered when we turn to non-moral dilemmas. Even if morality
could not place us in a situation in which we could not satisfy all its demands, our desires, for
example, certainly could. Suppose you want to keep both of your promises to Alice and Bert
but regard them as uniquely important. You have landed yourself in a dilemma concerning
what to do in light of your desires. We need a semantics that renders dilemmas coherently
expressible.
See also A , A , M , R , D , S , H
, C , D , F , T , P , B , M-
C , Z . See H  for an interpretation of Kant on which dilemmas are possi-
ble.
See, among many others, L ;  F ; W ; B M ;
F ; G ; D ; H ; H , ; G , S .

Attending to differences between weak and strong necessity modals can help us capture
both of these intuitions. Even if we cannot be required to perform each of several mutually
incompatible actions, ‘ought’ ≠ ‘is required’. Many nd it plausible that the dilemma in ()
expressed with ‘ought’ is consistent in a way that the dilemma in () expressed with ‘must’
is not.
() I ought to help Alice and I ought to help Bert, but I can’t help them both.
() I must help Alice and I must help Bert, but I can’t help them both.
Our semantics captures this by validating agglomeration for ‘must’ but not for ‘ought’: ‘Must
ϕ’ and ‘Must ψ’ entail ‘Must ϕ ∧ ψ’, but ‘Ought ϕ’ and ‘Ought ψ’ don’t entail ‘Ought ϕ ∧ ψ’.
Treating ‘must’ as an ordinary necessity modal validates agglomeration. If ⋂Pw ⊆ ϕ and
⋂Pw ⊆ ψ, then⋂Pw ⊆ ϕ∧ψ. If ‘ϕ’ and ‘ψ’ are contraries, then ‘Must ϕ’ and ‘Mustψ’ can both
be true only if Pw is inconsistent, i.e., only if⋂Pw = ∅. Insofar as quanti ers presuppose that
their domains are non-empty, this correctly predicts that dilemmas expressed with ‘must’ are
either infelicitous or inconsistent. By contrast,   allows dilemmas to be
consistently expressed with ‘ought’. ‘Ought ϕ’ and ‘Ought ψ’ can both be true, for contraries
‘ϕ’ and ‘ψ’, if (and only if) there are conditionsC andC′ such that ‘Must ϕ’ is true at all closest
relevant C-worlds w and ‘Must ψ’ is true at all closest relevant C′-worlds w′. If C and C′ are
incomparable in likelihood or desirability and there is no other relevant condition C′′ that is
at least as likely or desirable as C or C′, then both ‘Ought ϕ’ and ‘Ought ψ’ are assertable as
well.
If circumstances conspire aright, ‘Ought ϕ’ and ‘Ought ψ’ can both be true, even rela-
tive to the same unsaturated premise set. is raises the question of whether circumstances
could so conspire, or whether, for a given avor of modality, such an unsaturated premise
set could ever be called for. But this is a question for the world, or for substantive normative
See, e.g., L , G , H , S ; cf. F .
S  builds this sensitivity to incomparabilities into his semantics for ‘ought’. Swanson’s seman-
tics—or at least an adaptation of it with the limit assumption— treats ‘Ought ϕ’ as saying that ϕ follows from
some maximally consistent subset of Pw (for a possibly inconsistent premise set Pw). is semantics also pre-
dicts that dilemmas are coherently expressible with ‘ought’. (‘Must’ is given an ordinary semantics of necessity.
Compare these semantics for ‘ought’ and ‘must’ with the “con ict account” and “disjunctive account,” respec-
tively, of all-things-considered oughts in H , .) e analysis in this chapter has the advantage of
capturing a wider range of data.

theory, not for semantics. In the case of, say, desire-based dilemmas, the answer seems to
be a clear “Yes.” But perhaps the correct moral view excludes this possibility. ere may be
independent arguments for the conclusion that there are no genuine moral dilemmas. But
such arguments will need to be just that: independent—that is, independent of linguistic
intuitions like the intuition that () is inconsistent. Dilemmas are coherently expressible.
ey need not “entail a contradiction” (D : ).
.. Supererogation
Supererogatory acts are acts that go “beyond the call of duty.” To a rst approximation, they
are acts that are permitted but not required, and better than what is minimally required.
ink: throwing yourself on a grenade to protect your friends; giving a substantial portion
of your income to the poor; and so on.
Some ethicists deny that any acts are supererogatory. According to them, acts that are
intuitively supererogatory are in fact required. Others grant that there are supererogatory
acts, but hold that they are still binding in some sense and thus deserving of some criticism
if not performed. (ese are “anti-supererogationists” and “quali ed supererogationists,” re-
spectively, in the terminology of H .) e following is a not uncommon line of
argument: “It would be much better if I gave more money to the poor. I really ought to do
so. So, I must have conclusive reason, and hence an obligation, to give more to the poor. So,
my not giving more to the poor must be wrong and hence subject to criticism.” (“And so,”
the anti-supererogationist would add, “my giving more to the poor must not be supereroga-
tory aer all.”) is kind of argument generalizes, leading to the so-called “paradox of su-
pererogation,” or the “good-ought tie-up.” Here is Joseph Raz (though he ultimately rejects
this line of thought):
If doing a supererogatory act is praiseworthy there must be reasons for doing it,
and the reasons must outweigh any con icting reasons for not doing it. But if
there are conclusive reasons for performing the act then not to perform it is to
For classic examples of anti-supererogationism, see M , N , F , K
. For classic examples of quali ed supererogationism, see R , R , R . See
U  for the seminal work that prompted contemporary interest in supererogation. For extensive
treatments of supererogation, see especially H  and M .
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act against the balance of reasons. If reason requires that the act be done then
surely one ought to do it, and the “ought” is based on all the reasons which apply
to the case; it is a conclusive ought. But this entails that failing to perform the act
is failing to do what one ought (conclusively) to do, so why isn’t it blameworthy
not to perform a supererogatory act? (R : )
ere are several things to be distinguished in this type of argument: what is good, what
is blameworthy, what one ought to do, and what one is required to do. Suppose that it would
be supererogatory for you to give more to the poor, and that you ought to do so. (I need not
take a stand on whether all supererogatory acts, if there are any, are acts that one ought to
perform (as opposed to simply being acts that it would be better to perform). But for the sake
of argument we can suppose that they are.) Its being the case that you ought to give more to
the poor, however, does not imply that youmust, or that you are required or have conclusive
reason to do so. ‘Be required’ and ‘have conclusive reason’ express strong necessity. While it
is plausible that failing to do what one must is blameworthy, it is less obvious that one may
always be blamed for failing to do what is good.
e anti-supererogationist gets traction with the intuition that failing to do what one
must iswrong and subject to criticism. It is only if we con ate ‘must’ with ‘ought’— something
facilitated by the pervasive talk in ethics of “obligation” —that this intuition will seem to
speak against supererogationism. Of course, this does not mean that supererogationism is
correct. One might accept on independent grounds a demanding moral theory according
to which one must do what is evaluatively best. But many nd such a view implausible, and
it would be preferable if an alternative were available. By clarifying the distinction between
‘ought’ and ‘must’ we can see how it is at least coherent for a moral view to (a) distinguish
what one ought to do and what would be best from what one must do, or what is minimally
required, and (b) attach blame or criticism to failing to do the latter.
ere are two further intuitions many have about supererogation that our account is well
placed to capture. First, there are long traditions according to which it is only a select few,
perhaps those who have some sort of “higher calling,” who ought to perform supererogatory
Cf. H & P : : “Deontic necessity is commonly glossed as ‘obligation’, but the
noun obligation covers the range of should as well as must.”

actions. Second, many agents who perform supererogatory actions regard them as their
duty, or as things they must do. By treating premises as in force only given the satisfaction
of certain applicability conditions, and treating ‘ought’ as expressing necessity conditional on
certain such applicability conditions being satis ed, we can capture both of these intuitions.
Suppose there are conditional norms to the effect that one ϕs if one desires greater merit,
or has a higher calling, or has been given a special dispensation of divine grace, etc., whereϕ is
some intuitively supererogatory action. First, if Alice does not satisfy some such applicability
condition, ‘Alice must ϕ’ is false. But if it is plausible that Alice “has a higher calling” or the
like, one might truly say that Alice ought to ϕ. In this sense ϕ-ing may be supererogatory for
her. Even so, we can still capture the sense in which the act of ϕ-ing is supererogatory insofar
as agents in general fail to satisfy the relevant applicability conditions and the generic claim
‘One must ϕ’ is false.
Turning to the second intuition, given that agents are typically in a position to settle on
whether they desire greater merit, say, or satisfy the above sorts of applicability conditions, it
is unsurprising that those who perform supererogatory acts may regard them as things they
must do. By saying ‘Imustϕ’, the agent expresses that she is assuming that the supererogatory
norms in question apply to her. For the sake of argument, suppose the agent’s ‘must’ claim
is correct. Even so, as above, there is still a sense in which her act is supererogatory insofar
as the generic claim ‘One must ϕ’ is false. But there is also a sense in which her act may be
supererogatory for her. For even if she is among the select few, the fact that she is may itself
be the result of some supererogatory act(s). Her wanting to “go beyond the call,” say, is good
but not required of her. So, even if she must ϕ, it won’t be the case that she must be such that
she must ϕ. Her being such that ϕ-ing is required for her is itself supererogatory. ough
she may “just be doing her duty,” that it is her duty renders her deserving of praise.
is line has found support in all of Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant theologies. See H : ch. ;
M : ch.  for discussion.
For instance, concerning the “righteous gentiles” he interviewed from Le Chambon who protected Jews
from Nazis, Philip Hallie relates that they invariably “pulled back from me but looked rmly into my eyes and
said: ‘How can you call us “good”? We were doing what had to be done’ ” (H : , cited in H
& T : n.). See also, e.g., U : –; E .
Cf. B M  on iterated deontic modals.
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.. Judgment internalism
It is oen claimed that a distinctive mark of normative language and judgment is its practical
character, or its connection with action and motivation. is connection between norma-
tive language and action is epitomized in the thesis of judgment internalism— to a rst ap-
proximation, the claim that there is an internal and necessary connection between making a
normative judgment and being motivated to act accordingly. Here, for example, are Allan
Gibbard and Ralph Wedgwood:
e clear distinctive feature of normative concepts, I now think, lies in their
conceptual ties. Oughts of action tie in conceptually with acting. (G
: )
[T]he necessary connection that normative judgments have to motivation and
practical reasoning is a special feature of normative and evaluative judgments. It
is a feature that is absent from all judgments that are wholly non-normative and
non-evaluative in content. Indeed, this seems to be precisely one of the features
that distinguishes normative and evaluative judgments from judgments of all
other kinds. (W : )
Many take it as obvious that some form of internalism is true. Aer all, the reasons we weigh
in deliberation are reasons for action, i.e., reasons for acting on. Normative judgments are
constitutive of deliberation, and deliberation is essentially practical; its aim is action. But
many nd there to be clear counterexamples. What about the psychopath? Or someone who
is really tired or depressed? Can’t they make sincere normative judgments while lacking the
corresponding motivation?
Clarifying differences among necessity modals can illuminate metaethicists’ con icting
intuitions about judgment internalism. e continuation of the above quote from Gibbard
is revealing.
e clear distinctive feature of normative concepts, I now think, lies in their
conceptual ties. Oughts of action tie in conceptually with acting. Take, for ex-
ample, the belief that the building is on re and the one and only way to keep
For classic discussions, see F , N , W a, K , D .
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from being burned to a crisp is to leave forthwith. If that’s the case, we’d better
leave forthwith, but it isn’t strictly incoherent, conceptually, to have this belief
and not to leave. Contrast this with the normative belief that one must leave
forthwith. It is, I maintain, conceptually incoherent to hold this belief and not
leave, if one can. (G : )
It is revealing that Gibbard uses ‘must’ to pump the intuition that normative beliefs are con-
ceptually tied with action. Insofar as deontic ‘must’ is conventionally directive, it is no sur-
prise that judgment internalismwill seem compelling when considering deontic ‘must’ judg-
ments. Further, ‘must’ is nearly always used “subjectively” in the sense of L : Ut-
terances of ‘Must ϕ’ nearly always present the speaker as endorsing the norms with respect
to which the modal claim would be true. It is hard to hear a sincere utterance of ‘Must ϕ’
as consistent with the speaker’s being indifferent about ϕ.
() a. I must help my mother, but I won’t.
b. You must help your mother, but I don’t care whether you do.
c. You must help your mother. Aren’t family values stupid? I wouldn’t do it if I
were you.
Similarly for utterances with ‘have got to’:
() a. I’ve got to help my mother, but I won’t.
b. You’ve got to help your mother, but I don’t care whether you do.
c. You’ve got to help your mother. Aren’t family values stupid? I wouldn’t do it if
I were you.
But the same sorts of judgments are not nearly as anomalous when expressed with weak ne-
cessity modals, or with weak or strong necessity modals that are not typically subjective in
Lyons’s sense (e.g., ‘be supposed to’, ‘have to’). As we have seen, despite being the ethicist’s
paradigmatic normative term, deontic ‘ought’ is not conventionally directive. Interestingly,
‘is to’, in terms of which G  and W  effectively analyze all norma-
tive terms, is not conventionally subjective (L a).
See also L , H , L a,b, L , C , P , ,
V , H & P , S b.
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() a. I should help my mother, but I won’t.
b. You’re (supposed) to help your mother, but I don’t care if you do.
c. You have to help your mother. Aren’t family values stupid? I wouldn’t do it if I
were you.
We need not be psychopaths to sincerely utter the sentences in (). Even if internalism is
true for deontic ‘must’ and ‘have got to’ judgments, it is false for judgments expressed using
terms that are not conventionally directive or subjective.
In light of the various dimensions along which necessity modals can differ, we should be
cautious about ascribing properties to or giving general accounts of normative language and
judgment. One might even worry that construing the object of inquiry as a class of so-called
“normative” terms and concepts obscures the phenomena. Better perhaps to understand
ourselves as examining directive and subjective language.
e considerations in this section suggest the following general methodological lesson.
e ethicist oen comes to the table with various implicit views about how normative lan-
guage works, some correct but others not. ese assumptions can sometimes brought to
bear, perhaps inadvertently, in arguments on substantive normative and metanormative is-
sues. By locating these assumptions, the philosopher of language can free up the ethicist
in her investigations of normativity and normative thought and talk. In normative and
metanormative inquiry we must be sensitive to the particularities of the terms we use when
soliciting judgments about cases.
. Conclusion
‘Ought’ is the pet term of many a philosopher. It is thus surprising that there is nearly no
theoretical work investigating the meaning of ‘ought’ in contradistinction to other necessity
modals and normative terms. is is a problem for the philosopher of language and semanti-
cist, but it has implications for broader philosophical theorizing. Our study of the distinction
between ‘ought’ and ‘must’ is illustrative of how theoretical inquiry into normative language
Lyons’s distinction between “subjective” and “objective” uses might be captured by giving the former a
condition semantics treatment and the latter a contextualist treatment; compare the discussion of examples
(), (c), and () in §..

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Abstract
Kolodny andMacFarlane () havemade a pioneering contribution to our under-
standing of how the interpretation of deontic modals can be sensitive to evidence and
information. But integrating the discussion of information-sensitivity into the standard
Kratzerian framework for modals suggests ways of capturing the relevant data without
treating deontic modals as “informational modals” in their sense. I show that though
one such way of capturing the data within the standard semantics fails, an alternative
does not. Nevertheless I argue that we have good reasons to adopt an information-
sensitive semantics of the general type Kolodny and MacFarlane describe. Contrary to
the standard semantics, relative deontic value between possibilities sometimes depends
on which possibilities are live. I develop an ordering semantics for deontic modals that
captures this point and addresses various complications introduced by integrating the
discussion of information-sensitivity into the standard semantic framework. By attend-
ing to these complexities, we can also illuminate various roles that information and ev-
idence play in logical arguments, discourse, and deliberation.
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Kratzer, Rich omason, and audiences at MIT, the  ESSLLI Student Session, and the  Central APA
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Philosophical Logic for their valuable comments. anks especially to Eric Swanson for extensive discussion
and detailed comments on previous dras.
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. Introduction
Here is a familiar picture: Morality consists of a set of imperatives. What one ought to do
is a function solely of the imperatives in force and the facts about the world. For instance,
suppose you’re in a convenience store, considering whether or not to steal the chocolate bar
that’s calling out to you. Given the facts and the imperatives in force— for instance, Don’t
steal!—it’s obvious what you ought to do: you ought not steal the chocolate.
is type of view has a rich history. It has been articulated and defended by normative
ethicists of many stripes. Here is a representative quote:
Surely what a person ought or ought not do, what is permissible or impermis-
sible for him to do, does not turn on what he thinks is or will be the case, or
even on what he with the best will in the world thinks is or will be the case, but
instead on what is the case. (T : –)
As Prichard puts it (though he ultimately rejects this line of thought), what one ought to do
“depends [only] on the nature of the facts” (: ), that is, “facts about the world, known
or unknown” (L : ). Call deontic ‘ought’s interpreted with respect to such facts
about the relevant circumstances circumstantial ‘ought’s.
As a substantive normative matter, perhaps people like omson are right. Even so, lan-
guage and language users are not always privy to such loy normative truths. Even if what
we ought to do is what is best (in some sense) in light of the relevant external circumstances,
it is well known that we can at least ask and talk about what we ought to do in view of a cer-
tain body of evidence (information, belief, knowledge). (Distinctions between evidence-,
information-, belief-, or knowledge-sensitive readings of ‘ought’ won’t matter for our pur-
poses.) Deontic modals like ‘ought’ can be embedded in constructions that shi the relevant
deontic standard. Suppose Alice thinks we ought to do what’s best in light of the evidence.
So some deontic standards relevant to the evaluation of ‘we ought to ϕ’ in () are sensitive
to what the evidence is.
See also, e.g., B /, M , M , S , H , R
.
See, e.g., R ; P : –; E : ; B : –; G a:
–, b: –, : –; P : , a: ch. ; J ; W : ,
; K & MF : –.
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() a. As far as Alice is concerned, we ought to ϕ.
b. Alice thinks we ought to ϕ.
c. Given that we ought to do what’s best in light of the evidence, we ought to ϕ.
We need a semantics that can interpret evidence-sensitive readings of deontic ‘ought’, that is,
talk about what we ought to do in view of the evidence. We need a semantics that is neutral
on substantive normative philosophical issues about whether what one ought to do can turn
on features of one’s epistemic position. (I will focus my attention on weak necessity modals
like ‘ought’.)
e problem is that the standard semantics for modals stemming from Angelika Kratzer
(, ) seems to encode the normative assumptions of the familiar picture described
above. It seems to assume that deontic ‘ought’s are always circumstantial ‘ought’s. Simpli-
fying somewhat, for Kratzer deontic modals quantify over those possibilities, among those
consistent with certain relevant circumstances, that best approximate the deontic ideal. e
standard semantics thus appears to leave open how to interpret evidence-sensitive readings
of deontic modals. (We will characterize the standard semantics in greater detail in §..)
K & MF () have made a pioneering contribution to our under-
standing of how the interpretation of deontic modals and conditionals can be sensitive to
evidence and information. Ultimately they defend a non-standard semantics according to
which the calculation of a set of deontically ideal worlds, and hence the domain of quanti -
cation for a deontic modal, is determined relative to an information state. But Kolodny and
MacFarlane make no claims to integrate their discussion of information-sensitivity or their
resulting analysis into the standard Kratzerian framework formodals in linguistic semantics.
Doing so suggests alternative ways of capturing the data that they do not consider.
On the face of it, the x to the standard Kratzer semantics might seem simple: We might
treat evidence-sensitive ‘ought’s as quantifying over those possibilities, among those consis-
tent with a relevant body of evidence, that best approximate the deontic ideal. However, aer
gathering further data regarding the behavior of deontic ‘ought’ when unembedded in root
declarative clauses and embedded in conditionals (§.), I will show that this suggestion is
For example: “[Normative] conversational backgrounds can function as ordering sources for a circum-
stantial modal base,” where “[c]ircumstantial modality is the modality of rational agents” (: ; cf. :
–). is terminology will be clari ed in §..
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insufficient (§.). ough this strategy fails, an alternative version of the standard semantics
can indeed capture the relevant data, pace K & MF  and most others
in the recent literature on information-sensitivity (§.). A modal’s notional sensitivity to
information need not be captured by treating it semantically as an “informational modal” in
their sense (to be described).
Nevertheless I will argue that we have good reasons to adopt an information-sensitive
semantics of the general type described in K & MF  (§§.–.).
Contrary to the standard semantics, deontic rankings can themselves be information- or
evidence-sensitive in the following sense: Relative deontic value between possibilities some-
times depends on which possibilities are live. Capturing this point within a (revised) Kratze-
rian framework raises complications, both technical and philosophical, that Kolodny and
MacFarlane do not address. e main contributions of my theory, developed in §., con-
cern (a) how to capture information-sensitivity within an ordering semantics formodals and
restrictor semantics for conditionals, (b) how to do so in a way that captures the variety of
data and does not presuppose particular substantive normative views, and (c) how to inter-
pret the orderings generated in the semantics. (In the Appendix I offer, within the frame-
work of Discourse Representation eory, one way of formalizing the more theory-neutral
semantics developed in §..) By attending to the complexities introduced by integrating the
discussion of information-sensitivity into the standard semantic framework, we can also illu-
minate the various roles that information and evidence play in logical arguments, discourse,
and deliberation (§.).
. Data
Our child has injured himself and is badly in need of medical attention. e phones are
down, and there’s no way to call an ambulance. We quickly get our son into the car and race
to the local hospital. As we get closer, the traffic suddenly slows down on the highway. We
near an exit for Route  that would, under normal conditions, get us to the hospital faster.
e problem is that the city has been doing construction on Route  on alternating days, and
we have no way of nding out (without taking the route) whether they’re doing construction
on it today. If they are, we’ll get stuck, and our son will suffer serious long-term damage

and may even die; but if they aren’t, we’ll be able to speed along to the hospital. If we stay
put along our current route, we’ll make it to the hospital slowly but surely, but likely with
some complications from the delay. As it turns out, unbeknownst to us, they aren’t doing
construction on the ; the way is clear. What should we do?
When we make judgments about what to do in a position of uncertainty, we oen nd
ourselves hedging our bets in ways that we wouldn’t if we knew all the facts. (ink: insur-
ance policy purchases.) ere is a salient reading of ()—with implicit assumptions made
explicit in ()—on which it’s true.
() We ought to stay put.
() In view of the evidence, we ought to stay put.
Aer all, we don’t know, and have no way of nding out in advance, whether there is con-
struction on the , and the results will be disastrous if we switch but the  is blocked.
However, whenwe consider the case not fromour limited subjective perspective but from
a bird’s-eye point of view, the judgment in ()—with implicit assumptions made explicit in
()— can seem compelling.
() We ought to switch to the .
() In view of the relevant circumstances, we ought to switch to the .
Aer all, the way is in fact clear and switching to the  will get our child to the hospital most
quickly.
us I take it that () and () each has a reading on which it is true. On the true reading
of (), the ‘ought’ is interpreted as an evidence-sensitive ‘ought’, as “ought in view of the evi-
dence.” By contrast, on the true reading of (), the ‘ought’ is interpreted as a circumstantial
Compare K & MF  for discussion of the Miners Case from Par t (, a),
who credits it to Donald Regan (: n.); see also J .
A simple calculation of expected utility would explain the truth of () on its evidence-sensitive read-
ing—using two states (clear, blocked), two acts (stay put, switch routes), and relevant assignments of proba-
bilities to states and utilities to outcomes. However, I remain neutral here on what ultimately makes this nor-
mative conclusion correct; consequentialist, deontological, and virtue theories may all ratify it. Also, I bracket
just whose evidence is relevant and remain neutral between contextualist and non-contextualist treatments,
that is, neutral on whether the relevant evidential state is always supplied from the context or is sometimes
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‘ought’, as “ought in view of the relevant circumstances.” (Of course, since we do not have
access to the facts about the traffic conditions that help make () true, we would not be in
a position to assert (). But our question is simply whether () has a reading on which it is
true.)
Our rst piece of data is that deontic modals can be interpreted not only with respect
to a relevant body of facts about the world, known and unknown, but also with respect to a
relevant body of evidence. Unembedded deontic ‘ought’ can receive both circumstantial and
evidence-sensitive readings. ough deontic ‘ought’ can have these different readings, I’m
sympathetic with Kratzer’s view that “there is something in the meaning [of the modal]…
which stays invariable” (: ). So I assume that, other things being equal, it would be
preferable to derive circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings of ‘ought’ froma common
semantic core, or at least capture as much commonality between them as the data allows.
I should say that the distinction between circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings
is perhaps not a deep conceptual distinction. One of the relevant circumstances, one might
say, is that we do not know whether there is construction on the ; in that sense, ‘In view of
the relevant circumstances, we ought to stay put’ is true. True enough. But it is not counter-
intuitive that the sorts of facts that are targeted in phrases like ‘in view of the circumstances’
and in the relevant reading of () are facts about the external circumstances, or conditions
in the world over which the relevant agent(s) currently has (have) no direct control. In (),
for example, ‘the relevant circumstances’ can be understood as short for “the relevant facts
or circumstances concerning the traffic conditions, our current location, our child’s physical
condition, our driving skills, etc.” In view of these facts, it makes sense to say that () is true.
supplied from a context of assessment or a parameter of the circumstance of evaluation (see, e.g., S
a, Y ,  F & G , D , M ; cf. Chapter I).
Readerswho deny that the correct deontic view is such thatwhatwe ought to do can be sensitive to features
of our limited epistemic position may feel free to embed sentences under, e.g., “Given the truth of X’s beliefs
about the correct deontic view.” My distinction between “circumstantial” and “evidence-sensitive” ‘ought’s
closely mirrors the common distinction between “objective” and “subjective” senses of ‘ought’. I use ‘circum-
stantial’ instead of ‘objective’ because such interpretations simply need to be sensitive to certain contextually
relevant circumstances; the objective ‘ought’ is a limiting case of this. I avoid calling the evidence-sensitive
reading “subjective” for reasons that will become clear below. I use ‘circumstantial’ and ‘evidence-sensitive’ to
map onto circumstantial and epistemic modal bases, respectively (see §.).
See also W ; L ; A ; B ; G ; P
; P  (though cf. C , Q  . , P ). For discussions of prolifer-
ating senses of ‘ought’ in the ethics literature, see, e.g., J , F ,  R .
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It is in this way that our talk about “circumstantial ‘ought’s” and what we ought to do in view
of “the relevant facts or circumstances” should be understood (cf. A ).
Second, thoughwe can get alternative readings of unembeddeddeontic ‘ought’s, as brought
out in the availability of both () and (), there are interesting constraints on what readings
are available in conditionals. e reading of ‘ought’ in ‘we ought to stay put’ is simply un-
available in a true reading of the straight ‘if p, (then) q’ hypothetical conditional:
() If the way is clear, we ought to stay put.
() If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
In a manner to be explained, the ‘ought’ in the consequent of () seems to be interpreted
as if the information that the way is clear is already available, this despite the fact that the
antecedent of () is not as in ().
() a. If the way is clear and we know it, we ought to switch to the .
b. If we learn that the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
If there is a true reading at all of a deontic conditional like () with () as its consequent
clause, this reading is only available with a construction like ‘even if ’ or ‘still’:
() Even if the way is clear, we still ought to stay put.
I use the term ‘hypothetical conditional’ in the sense of I .
One might say that we take () to be true because we reinterpret it as enthymematic for (), implicitly
assuming that we can learn whether the way is clear (see  F ). But I take this suggestion to be
something of a non-starter (see C  for further discussion). First, at least in cases with deontic ‘must’,
there seems to be a contrast in acceptability between conditionals with ‘if ψ’ and ‘if we learn that ψ’ as their
antecedents:
(i) ?If the way is clear, we must switch to the .
(ii) If we learn that the way is clear, we must switch to the .
Judgments are subtle here. But informal polling suggests that, in the context as described, whereas (i) is dis-
preferred—we do not have an obligation to switch to the  conditional on how the world happens to be— (ii)
is true. is suggests that the antecedent in (i) is not reinterpreted as in (ii). It would be odd if the antecedents
of deontic ‘ought’ conditionals were reinterpreted in the proposed way but the antecedents of deontic ‘must’
conditionals were not. Second, the reinterpretation move is ad hoc. ere is no independent mechanism I
know of to motivate why this type of reinterpretation should occur in these examples. In any event, it will be
instructive to examine the prospects for developing a semantics that captures how (), as it stands, is true.
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. e standard semantics
Our task is to examine whether the standard semantics can accommodate these phenom-
ena. Let’s clarify what this “standard semantics” is. Standardly, modals are interpreted as
quanti ers over possible worlds. Simplifying a bit, the domain of quanti cation is set by
two contextually supplied parameters: a set f of accessible worlds (a “modal base”), and a
preorder ≲ (a re exive and transitive relation) onW, where this preorder ranks worlds along
some relevant dimension. e modal quanti es over those worlds in the modal base that
rank highest in the preorder. Different readings of modals arise from different contextual
resolutions of the modal base and preorder.
Modal bases determine re exive accessibility relations: they are sets of worlds consistent
with a body of truths in the world of evaluation. For Kratzer, the two main types of modal
bases are circumstantial (a set of worlds consistent with certain relevant circumstances), on
the one hand, and evidence-based or epistemic (a set of worlds consistent with a certain
relevant body of evidence), on the other. (I’ll use ‘epistemic’ broadly to cover modal bases
describing relevant bodies of knowledge or evidence.) Hereaer I assume that our preorders
are deontic and are indexed to a world of evaluation—written ‘≲w’ (read: “is at least as de-
ontically good as at w”)— since, as we saw in (), deontic modals can themselves occur in
intensional contexts that shi the ordering.
A deontic selection function D can be de ned to select from some domain those worlds
that are not ≲w bettered by any other world:
De nition . ∀Z ⊆W∶D(Z,≲w) ∶= {w′ ∈ Z∶ ∀w′′ ∈ Z∶w′′ ≲w w′⇒ w′ ≲w w′′}
D selects the set of ≲w-maximal (“≲w-best”) worlds from the modal base, those worlds in
the modal base that best approximate the deontic ideal. Modals quantify over these worlds
in D(f(w),≲w). As deontic modals, on Kratzer’s view, take circumstantial modal bases, the
truth-conditions for ‘Ought ϕ’ are roughly as follows. (‘J K’ denotes the interpretation func-
tion, a function from contexts c, indices w, and well-formed expressions to extensions.)
In addition to K , , , see L , ,  F , V .
I make the following simplifying assumptions: I treat modal bases as mapping worlds to sets of worlds,
rather than to sets of propositions (and use ‘modal base’ to refer sometimes to this function, sometimes to
its value given a world of evaluation); I abstract away from details introduced by Kratzer’s ordering source; I
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De nition . JOught ϕKc,w =  iff ∀w′ ∈ D(fcirc(w),≲w)∶ JϕKc,w′ = 
is says that ‘Ought ϕ’ is true iff ‘ϕ’ is true at all the best circumstantially accessible worlds.
I assume a Kratzerian restrictor analysis of conditionals on which ‘if ’-clauses restrict the
modal bases of various operators like modals. To interpret a conditional, on this view,
evaluate the proposition expressed by the consequent clause relative to (a) the preorder at the
world of evaluation, and (b) the modal base at the world of evaluation restricted to worlds in
which the antecedent is true:
De nition . JIf ψ, ought ϕKc,w =  iff ∀w′ ∈ D(f+(w),≲w)∶ JϕKc,w′ = ,
where f+(w) = f(w) ∩ JψKc. (Remark: JαKc ∶= {w ∶ JαKc,w = } )
is says that ‘If ψ, ought ϕ’ is true iff ‘ϕ’ is true in all the accessible ψ-worlds that are best
in view of the deontic ideal at the world of evaluation.
Call this package ‘the standard Kratzer semantics’, or simply ‘the standard semantics’.
ere is a feature of this view that I want to highlight. On the standard semantics, the pre-
orders with respect to whichmodals are interpreted are independently de ned in the follow-
ing sense. ey are preorders onW. eonly role of themodal base is to restrict our attention
to different subsets of the given preorder. Specifying a modal base just knocks worlds out
of the ranking; it doesn’t change how the remaining worlds are ranked. ough ‘ought’ in
De nition  is treated as quantifying over the worlds in D(f(w),≲w), this notation is a bit
sloppy. More precisely, the standard semantics says that given a preordered set (W,≲w) and
non-empty subset f(w) of W, ‘ought’ quanti es over the worlds in D (f(w),≲w∩ f(w)).
De nition . For a set S, its binary Cartesian product S = S × S = {⟨x, y⟩∶ x ∈ S ∧ y ∈ S}.
Since ≲w ∩ f(w) is just a sub-preorder of ≲w, the relations between worlds as given by the
preorder ≲w on W will be maintained when we only consider the worlds in the given modal
base. Informally, how worlds are ranked relative to one another is independent of which
other worlds are relevant. is feature of the standard semantics will be important in what
follows.
make the Limit Assumption (L : –) and assume that our selection function is well-de ned and
non-empty; and I bracket differences in quanti cational strength between weak and strong necessity modals.
For semantics without the Limit Assumption, see L , , K , , S . See
Chapter II on the distinction between weak and strong necessity modals.
See K : –, : –. Cf. L : –.
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. A failed rst pass
is ordering semantics framework suggests two general ways of attempting to capture the
difference between circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings of deontic ‘ought’: posit
a shi in modal base, or posit a shi in preorder. Let’s start with the former option: there
is a shi in modal base but a constant preorder in the interpretations of circumstantial and
evidence-sensitive readings of ‘ought’. We will return to the latter option in §. aer we are
in a position to compare it to our alternative proposal developed in §..
One might think that what changes in the interpretation of circumstantial and evidence-
sensitive ‘ought’s is the set of possibilities being considered, or the modal base. is is sug-
gested by our paraphrases of () and () in () and (), respectively, reproduced below.
() We ought to stay put.
() In view of the evidence, we ought to stay put.
() We ought to switch to the .
() In view of the circumstances, we ought to switch to the .
As noted above, for Kratzer the two main types of modal bases are circumstantial and epis-
temic; it is the role of adverbial phrases like “in view of the relevant circumstances” and
“in view of the evidence” to supply these respective modal bases for the interpretation of
the modal. So one might think that () is true on its “epistemic” reading, where the modal
base consists of a set of worlds consistent with the evidence (which, importantly, leaves open
whether there is construction on the ); whereas () and ()
() If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
are true on their “circumstantial” readings, where themodal base is a set of worlds consistent
with the relevant circumstances (which, importantly, establish that the  is clear). In this way,
one might think that a circumstantial modal base determines the circumstantial ‘ought’ and
an epistemic modal base determines the evidence-sensitive ‘ought’ (again, where a constant
deontic preorder is used in interpreting both readings). Call this hypothesis ‘ 

’.
Assuming a Kratzerian restrictor analysis of conditionals as given in De nition , the
predicted truth-conditions of (), according to   , will be as in ().
() J()Kc,w =  iff ∀w′ ∈ D(f+circ(w),≲w): we switch to the  in w′, where f+circ(w) =
fcirc(w) ∩ {w′′∶ the way is clear in w′′}
is says () is true iff we switch to the  in all the circumstantially accessible worlds in which
the way is clear that are best in view of the deontic ideal at the world of evaluation.
ere is something importantly right about  . However, it is insufficient
as it stands. First, we do not yet have an explanation for how () could be true, even on its
evidence-sensitive reading, given that () is true on its circumstantial reading. Consider two
worldsw′ andw′′ such thatw′ ∈ D(fcirc(w),≲w) andw′′ ∈ D(fepist(w),≲w)—where fepist(w) is
the set of worlds consistent with the available evidence about the road conditions, our child’s
health, the location of the hospital, and so on. ough in w′ we switch to the  and in w′′ we
stay put, w′ and w′′ are otherwise identical; the way is clear in both w′ and w′′. Challenge:
How could w′ be a ≲w-best world in fcirc(w) but not in fepist(w)? How could it be that all the
≲w-best worlds in fepist(w) aren’t all worlds where we switch to the , given that in someworlds
in fepist(w) the way is clear? We need an explanation for how and in what sense staying put
could be best.
More precisely, consider the following worlds, CS, BS, CP, and BP, characterized with
respect to the relevant state of the world (whether the way is Clear or Blocked) and action
taken (whether we Switch or stay Put), and which are consistent with the other details of the
case. (ese might be treated as representatives of suitable equivalence classes of worlds.)
Given our description of the case, the epistemic modal base is a subset of the circumstantial
modal base. Roughly, the two are identical except for the fact that all worlds consistent with
the relevant circumstances are worlds where the way is clear, whereas someworlds consistent
with our evidence are worlds where the way is blocked: fcirc(w) = {CS,CP} and fepist(w) =
{CS,BS,CP,BP}. (Since the way is actually clear, the evaluation world w may be either CS
or CP.) Given that on their circumstantial readings () is true and () is false, we see that
CS ∈ D(fcirc(w),≲w) and that CS <w CP. e worry for    is that given that
CS remains in the epistemic modal base fepist(w), and given that the less long-term damage
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for our child the better, CS remains deontically best when BS and BP are added to the modal
base.
Second, conversely,    does not account for how () could be true on
its circumstantial reading given that () is true on its evidence-sensitive reading. Intuitively,
since the circumstantial modal base is a subset of the epistemic modal base, if a world in the
epistemic modal base is best by ≲w, it will remain best when the domain is restricted to the
circumstantial modal base. More formally: Since ≲w is just a set of ordered pairs, we can
intersect it with another set of ordered pairs to yield an order preserving sub-preorder.
De nition . Let S = (S,≲S) and T = (T,≲T) be preordered sets. S ⊴ T (read: ‘S is a sub-
preorder of T’) if S ⊆ T and ≲S=≲T ∩ S.
Proposition . Let S = (S,≲S) and T = (T,≲T) be preordered sets such that S ⊴ T. ∀u, v ∈
S∶u ≲T v⇔ u ≲S v.
eorem . Let S = (S,≲S) and T = (T,≲T) be preordered sets such that S ⊴ T. ∀u ∈ S∶u ∈
D(T,≲T)⇒ u ∈ D(S,≲S).
Proof. Consider an element u∗ of S. Suppose for reductio (i) that u∗ ∈ D(T,≲T), and (ii)
that u∗ ∉ D(S,≲S). By (i) and De nition , ∀u′ ∈ T∶u′ ≲T u∗ ⇒ u∗ ≲T u′. But by (ii) and
De nition  it follows that there is a world v ∈ S such that v ≲S u∗∧ u∗ ≴S v. Since S ⊆ T, v ∈ T.
So v ≲T u∗ ∧ u∗ ≴T v, since by Proposition  ≲S is an order preserving sub-preorder of ≲T.
Contradiction. So, ∀u ∈ S∶u ∈ D(T,≲T)⇒ u ∈ D(S,≲S).
e problem is that if w′ is inD(fepist(w),≲w), then, since w′ ∈ fcirc(w) and fcirc(w) ⊂ fepist(w),
w′ is also inD(fcirc(w),≲w). By eorem , the deontically best worlds in fepist(w), given that
they are also consistent with the relevant circumstances, remain deontically best with respect
to a contraction of the domain to fcirc(w). So    incorrectly predicts that if
() is true, () is false, even when the former is given an evidence-sensitive reading and the
latter is given a circumstantial reading.
Now turn to the indicative conditional in (). e third problem for   
is that in order to accommodate the felicity of (),    would have to say that
the relevant circumstances do not specify whether or not the way is clear (assuming, as is
plausible, that ‘if p . . . ’ presupposes that p is not settled). But the relevant circumstances do

specify this; this is part of what makes () true. So the choice of modal base in () seems ad
hoc. Treating the modal base as circumstantial also obscures such conditionals’ continuity
with unembedded evidence-sensitive ‘oughts’. Example () seems as closely related to () as
expected utility is to conditional expected utility. (We will return to this point in §..)
Fourth, modifying    by treating the modal base in the conditional as
epistemic still leaves problems. is is because, for Kratzer, the antecedent of a deontic con-
ditional ‘If ψ, ought ϕ’ restricts the preorder used to evaluate ‘ought ϕ’ to preorder only the
ψ-worlds. Paralleling our second argument above, we can intersect ≲w with another set of
ordered pairs— the binary Cartesian product of JψK —to yield an order preserving sub-
preorder used in evaluating ‘ought ϕ’. Intersecting ≲w with JψK yields a preorder over only
ψ-worlds preordered by ≲w that maintains the relations between them speci ed by ≲w. So,
as long as the way is clear in some world w′ ∈ D(fepist(w),≲w)—or at least as long as ‘In view
of our evidence, our staying put is better than our switching’ is true relative to ≲w —if the
≲w-best worlds out of some domain are worlds where we stay put, then the best worlds with
respect to the sub-preorder ≲w ∩ Jthe way is clearK will still be worlds where we stay put.
M   incorrectly predicts that () is false given that () is true. We still need
an explanation for how () and () are both true and felicitous.
Onemight try to salvage    by advancing a covert higher modal analysis
of deontic conditionals like (). On such an analysis, the ‘if ’-clause in an overtly modal-
ized conditional like () restricts the modal base of a posited higher covert modal, rather
than that of the overt modal. In effect, the conditional claims that the modal sentence ‘we
ought to switch to the ’ is true in all the worlds w′ accessible from w where the way is clear.
Assuming the covertmodal is epistemic (as is customary), we get roughly the following truth-
conditions for (), where f+epist(w) = fepist(w) ∩ {w′′′∶ the way is clear in w′′′}.
() J()Kc,w =  iff ∀w′ ∈ f+epist(w)∶ ∀w′′ ∈ D(fcirc(w′),≲w′): we switch to the  in w′′
A covert modal analysis might be thought to help respond to our fourth objection, that of
explaining how () and () are both true, for the following reason. When evaluating the
anks to Eric Swanson for this way of putting the point.
For defenses of covert modal analyses of various conditional constructions, see F , G
,  F & I , L , S , and S .

consequent clause we see what is deontically best in view of the preorder at the worlds w′ in
which the way is clear. So, as long as the deontic preorder at some world w′ accessible from
the world of evaluation ranks some world w′′ (accessible from w′) where we switch to the 
as best— and assuming suitable constraints on the modal base of the overt modal— () will
be true even if () is true.
is response won’t itself do the trick, even putting aside the fact that it won’t help 
  respond to our rst three objections above. First, the reply turns on the assump-
tion that the deontic preorder at the (epistemically) accessible worlds is relevantly different
from the deontic preorder at w. But we can stipulate as a feature of the case that we have no
relevant normative uncertainty. e deontic preorder then won’t vary across epistemically
accessible worlds. is is a problem because, if the deontic preorder is kept constant, 
  won’t be able to show how () is consistent with (). Since modal bases deter-
mine re exive accessibility relations, the world of evaluation w is always one of the worlds
w′ in the modal base. But, as we saw in the second objection above,    can-
not capture how ‘we ought to switch to the ’ is true at w (= w′), even on its circumstantial
reading; and so, it still cannot capture how () is true, given that () is true.
Here is another way of making the same point. Given that ‘we ought to stay put’ is true
in the world of evaluation w, the accessible worlds that are ≲w-best are worlds where we
stay put. Now suppose that in w, the way is clear and we stay put, and that w is much like
the actual world (e.g., in its laws) but is otherwise deontically perfect. So one of the ≲w-
best worlds where the way is clear is a world where we stay put. Again, since modal bases
determine re exive accessibility relations, w is one of the worlds w′ that is accessible from w.
So one of the ≲w′-best worlds accessible from the accessible worlds where the way is clear is a
world where we stay put (again, assuming that all circumstantially accessible worlds are also
epistemically accessible). But the conditional says that all the best worlds accessible from the
accessible worlds where theway is clear areworlds wherewe switch to the . Contradiction.
More formally: Suppose () is true in the world of evaluation w, and the way happens to be clear in
w. en ∀w′ ∈ D(fepist(w),≲w)∶ we stay put in w′. Suppose the world of evaluation w is one such world
w′ ∈ D(fepist(w),≲w); accordingly, we stay put in w. As noted above, fcirc(w′) ⊂ fepist(w); and suppose that
∀w′′′ ∈ fepist(w)∶ ∀u, v ∈ fcirc(w′′′)∶u ≲w′′′ v⇔ v ≲w′′′ u. (Weaker assumptions would suffice for our purposes,
but these make the problem more transparent.) en w ∈ D(fcirc(w′),≲w′). So, since the way is clear in w,
∃w′ ∈ f+epist(w)∶ ∃w′′ ∈ D(fcirc(w′),≲w′)∶ we stay put (and thus don’t switch to the ) in w′′—namely, where

Intuitively, () and () are both true in the speci ed model. But, even with a covert modal
analysis,    incorrectly predicts that they are inconsistent.
ere may be various ways to modify    to ward off some of these con-
cerns. However, the arguments of this section suggest the following general lesson. It cannot
simply be a shi in modal base that explains the observed variation in readings. A semantics
that treats modal bases merely as restrictors of an independently de ned deontic preorder
will not be able to accommodate the data described in §.. In the next section I will outline
a semantics that elucidates our data. is will obviate themotivation to add further epicycles
to   . (We will return to the “shi in preorder” strategy in §..)
. A solution: Information-re ecting deontic preorders
As I see it, the problem with    is not its claim that the ‘in view of ’ phrases
in glosses like “ought in view of our evidence” and “ought in view of the circumstances” play
their usual role of specifying a modal base. e problem is that the devil’s in the preorder.
I suggest that, contrary to the standard semantics, evaluations of deontic betterness among
worlds in a domain can depend essentially on global properties of that domain. Deontic
requirements need not simply order worlds in the modal base; they can also be sensitive to
the fact that the modal base is as it is. We need the accessible worlds to be able to “see” what
the other accessible worlds are like. is suggests the following glosses for (), (), and ().
() a. Given that the epistemic modal base is as it is— i.e., given that it contains both
worlds where the way is clear and worlds where the way is not clear— the best
of these are worlds where we stay put.
b. Given that the circumstantial modal base is as it is— i.e., given that it contains
only worlds where the way is clear— the best of these are worlds where we
switch to the .
c. If the way is clear, then, given that the updated modal base is as it is— i.e.,
given that it contains only worlds where the way is clear— the best of these are
worlds where we switch to the .
w = w′ = w′′. But () says that∀w′ ∈ f+epist(w)∶ ∀w′′ ∈ D(fcirc(w′),≲w′)∶we switch to the  in w′′. Contradiction.

ere are a number of ways we might implement this informal thought. We might avail
ourselves of the resources of decision theory and build probability functions and utility func-
tions into the semantics, perhaps deriving deontic preorders from calculations of expected
utility. For the sake of generality I will put this strategy aside. Abstracting away from
details about how deontic preorders are generated, what we need in our revised Kratzer se-
mantics is for the generation of deontic preorders to be information-sensitive in the following
sense: It needs to be sensitive to what the set being preordered is like. A world’s position
in the deontic preorder cannot always be determined independently of which worlds are in
the set being preordered. Deontic preorders can thus re ect a world’s relative approxima-
tion of a deontic ideal, where what this ideal is can vary given different information states. In
decision-theoretic terms, the preorder onworlds can be treated as re ecting, not the absolute
utilities of the possible outcomes— e.g., no delay, short delay, long delay—but the expected
utilities of the various acts one performs or strategies one takes in those worlds.
We can capture this by indexing the deontic preorder used in interpreting weak neces-
sity modals like ‘ought’ to a world of evaluation and an information state (a set of worlds)
s—written ‘≲w,s’. (Which information state? e information state characterizing themodal’s
local context, or the original context as possiblymodi ed by a clause or part of a clause. More
on this shortly.) is suggests the following revised truth-conditions:
De nition . JOught ϕKc,w =  iff ∀w′ ∈ D(f(w), [λs. ≲w,s] (f(w)))∶ JϕKc,w′ = 
As we will see, s need not represent the information state of anyone in particular. I use
the term ‘information state’ in a broad sense simply to describe a set of worlds. Both epis-
See L  for developments (though cf. K ).
is amounts to a denial of the assumption articulated in S & T :  and S-
 :  for the case of the similarity relation used in interpreting counterfactuals. Cf. Kolodny and
MacFarlane’s treatment of deontic selection functions as “seriously information-dependent” (: ).
us Charlow’s (a) worry that the semantics in K & MF  violates an analog
of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives does not carry over to the semantics presented here (, –;
cf. L : ).
In the terminology from K & MF , this semantics treats deontic ‘ought’ as an
“informational modal” (). See the Appendix for a concrete way of formalizing the largely theory-neutral
analysis presented here within Discourse Representation eory. For alternative, independently developed ac-
counts, see B& F , C  . , C a, and L , in addition
to the seminal discussion in K & MF . Again, given our purposes in this chapter I am
bracketing the sorts of complications to the semantics of weak necessity modals described in Chapter II.

temic and circumstantial modal bases—updated or not— represent information states in
this sense. (oughmore ne-grained characterizations of information statesmay be needed
to deliver the appropriate verdicts for more complex cases— e.g., certain cases involving
probabilistic information or evidence—given our purposes I bracket such complications
here.)
e contrast with Kratzer is important. As noted in §., on the standard semantics
modals are interpreted with respect to an independently de ned preorder; the modal base
simply restricts our attention to different subsets of it. More formally, context supplies a de-
ontic preorder on W that is a function solely of the world of evaluation w. Fixing w xes the
preorder. e only role of the modal base f(w) is to generate a sub-preorder ≲w∩ f(w), the
maximal elements of which supply the modal’s domain of quanti cation. Consequently, if
one world is ranked better than another according to the preorder, it will remain better with
respect to any subset that contains both worlds as members (see eorem ). By contrast,
on my revised picture what context supplies is a function from a modal base (and a world of
evaluation) to a preorder on that modal base. In this way, the modal base does not simply
restrict an independently de ned preorder; it helps determine what the preorder is. As a re-
sult, two worlds can be ranked differently relative to one another when members of different
modal bases. ese contrasts are re ected in Figure ..
















De nition . < (read: “is deontically better than”) is a strict partial order such that∀w′,w′′∶w′ <
w′′⇔ w′ ≲ w′′ ∧ w′′ ≴ w′.

K :
W = {w,w,w,w}. <w = {⟨w,w⟩, ⟨w,w⟩, ⟨w,w⟩, ⟨w,w⟩, ⟨w,w⟩, ⟨w,w⟩}
f(w) ⊂W = {w,w,w}. <w ∩ f(w) = {⟨w,w⟩, ⟨w,w⟩, ⟨w,w⟩}
f(w) ⊂W = {w,w,w}. <w ∩ f(w) = {⟨w,w⟩, ⟨w,w⟩, ⟨w,w⟩}
- :
f(w) = {w,w,w}. [λs . <w,s] (f(w)) = <w,f(w)= {⟨w,w⟩, ⟨w,w⟩, ⟨w,w⟩}
f(w) = {w,w}. [λs . <w,s] (f(w)) = <w,f(w)= {⟨w,w⟩}
A word on terminology. Call a function [λs . ≲w,s] from information states to preorders
a preorder selector. A preorder selector is information-sensitive, in my sense, iff it is a non-
constant function from information states to preorders, that is, a function that sometimes
yields different preorderswhen given different information states as arguments. By extension
I will say that a preorder is information-re ecting iff it is the value of an information-sensitive
preorder selector.
Before turning to our data, it is worth mentioning that our indexing preorders to an
information state does not itself imply that modals with information-sensitive and non-
information-sensitive interpretations have distinct lexical entries. As noted in §§.–., one
perceived advantage of Kratzer’s framework is that by treating modals as context-dependent
quanti ers it captures the various avors ofmodality in a uni edwaywithout positing an am-
biguity. e analysis here does not force us to forfeit this advantage. (ough of course one
might accept that modals are ambiguous on other grounds.) All modals can be interpreted
with respect to preorders that are indexed to an information state, even if some preorders
are not sensitive to the value of this parameter— that is, even if some are non-information-
re ecting. Information-sensitive ‘ought’ need not have a distinct lexical entry.
In the remainder of this section I will explain in a more or less theory-neutral way how
information-sensitive deontic preorder selectors can help account for the data from §..
Revising Kratzer’s account in light of received philosophical considerations about how evi-
dence can bear on what we ought to do generates an improved semantics that nicely predicts
our data.

I noted above that deontic preorders used in interpreting ‘ought’ are to be indexed to
the information state determined by the modal’s local context. In an unembedded sentence
‘Ought ϕ’, the local context is equivalent to the global context; thus, ≲ is indexed to w and
f(w).
Start with (), our evidence-sensitive deontic ‘ought’ in a root declarative clause. Here
s = fepist(w), the set of worlds consistent with the available evidence. We predict the following
truth-conditions.
() We ought to stay put.
() J()Kc,w =  iff ∀w′ ∈ D(s,≲w,s): we stay put in w′, where s = fepist(w)
Since the deontic preorder is indexed to the set of epistemically accessible worlds fepist(w),
we correctly predict that () is true. Since some worlds in fepist(w) are worlds where the way
is clear and some are worlds where the way is blocked, the ≲w,fepist(w)-best of these worlds will
be worlds where we stay put. (Here and throughout I assume we are restricting our attention
to information-sensitive preorder selectors that re ect plausible views on how deontic value
depends on information.) We can thus explain our rst piece of data: the true reading of (),
where ‘ought’ is interpreted as “ought in view of the evidence.” As is evident, it isn’t simply the
fact that the modal base is epistemic that explains how this reading is generated. e deontic
preorder also re ects what this modal base is like— speci cally, that it includes some worlds
where the way is clear and some worlds where it isn’t.
Now turn to the true reading of (). Re ecting that the ‘ought’ is interpreted as a circum-
stantial ‘ought’, “ought in view of the relevant circumstances,” the relevant information state
s∗ will be set to fcirc(w):
() We ought to switch to the .
() J()Kc,w =  iff ∀w′ ∈ D(s∗,≲w,s∗): we switch to the  in w′, where s∗ = fcirc(w)
Examples involving claims about what some other agent ought to do in view of her evidence or claims
about one ought to do in view of some other contextually salient body of information—where the agent’s
evidence or the salient information differ from the evidence available in the conversational context—pose no
special problems and may be treated analogously. In such cases the modal base and the information state to
which the preorder is indexed is, intuitively, the one characterizing the agent’s epistemic state or the contextually
salient body of information (though see n. ).

Insofar as the information-re ecting deontic preorder is indexed to the circumstantialmodal
base s∗—which, importantly, includes only worlds where the way is clear— the ≲w,fcirc(w)-
best of these worlds will be worlds in which we switch to the . is is the correct result.
But if the preorders used in interpreting () and () are relevantly different in these
ways, insofar as they rank certain pairs of worlds differently, do circumstantial and evidence-
sensitive readings of ‘ought’ really count as being derived from a common semantic core (see
§.)? Yes. On the standard Kratzer semantics, what context supplies for the interpretation
of a modal isn’t, strictly speaking, a set of accessible worlds and a preorder; rather, what is
supplied is a function from a world of evaluation to a set of accessible worlds and a preorder.
As a result, though the relevant circumstances, for example, may vary from world to world,
what is contributed for interpretation by a phrase like ‘in view of the relevant circumstances’
remains constant; it is a function from a world w to the set of worlds consistent with the
relevant circumstances in w. We re ected this in the formalism by treating modal bases f as
taking worlds as argument and indexing deontic preorders to worlds. e situation is pre-
cisely parallel in our revised picture. ough the deontic preorder can vary from information
state to information state (and perhaps from world to world), what is contributed to the in-
terpretation of ‘ought’ that makes it count as “deontic” remains constant; it is a function from
aworld and an information state to a preorder, as re ected in the formalism by double index-
ing the preorder to these two parameters. As captured in the truth-conditions in De nition
, this is so regardless of whether the modal is given an evidence-sensitive or circumstantial
reading. It is in this sense that our analysis derives circumstantial and evidence-sensitive
readings of deontic ‘ought’ in a uni ed way from a common semantic core.
Complicating matters a bit, let’s return to the deontic conditional in ().
() If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
e appropriate reading for () is predicted from independent principles of local interpreta-
tion. Following K , S , and H , among many others,
I assume that the consequent of a conditional must be interpreted with respect to the local
context set up by the antecedent— i.e., with respect to the global context (hypothetically)

incremented with the antecedent. Accordingly, in a deontic hypothetical conditional ‘If ψ,
ought ϕ’, the preorder will be indexed to w and f(w) ∩ JψKc. In () the ‘ought’ in the conse-
quent is interpreted with respect to the global context incremented with the proposition that
the way is clear, as re ected in (). e truth-conditions for () are given in ().
() [If the way is clear]c [we ought to switch to the ]c=c∩ p
() J()Kc,w =  iff ∀w′ ∈ D(s+,≲w,s+): we switch to the  in w′, where s+ = fepist(w) ∩
{w′′∶ the way is clear in w′′}
e global context is, roughly, the set of worlds consistent with the evidence (see §.). e
‘if ’-clause restricts this set to contain only worlds where the way is clear. As the modal in
the consequent clause is interpreted relative to this updated context, the deontic preorder is
indexed to this restricted set of worlds that encodes the information that the way is clear.
Given that f+epist(w) contains only worlds where the way is clear, the deontically best of these,
relative to this updated information state, are worlds in which we switch to the . In this
way, in conditionals like () we, in effect, update our epistemic state with the information
expressed in the antecedent and then determine what ought to be in light of that updated
information state.
. Shis in preorder?
In §. we noted that the standard Kratzer semantics suggests two broad ways of capturing
the difference between circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings of deontic ‘ought’—
namely, in terms of a difference in modal base, on the one hand, and preorder, on the other.
In §. I argued that positing that this difference is merely due to a shi in modal base faces
serious problems. We are now in a position to assess the other type of analysis that avoids
making the sorts of revisions to Kratzer’s ordering semantics developed in §..
I am blurring the distinction between global contexts and the (epistemic) modal bases they determine.
Given the sort of context-dependence we are interested in, no harm will come from this. For expository pur-
poses I assume that the incrementing proceeds via set-intersection. e point about local interpretation might
be put in terms of context change potentials; however, it is ultimately neutral between static implementations
(à la Stalnaker) and dynamic implementations (à la Heim), yielding truth-conditions and context change po-
tentials, respectively, as semantic values.

us far I have bracketed details regarding how the preorders used in interpretingmodals
are generated. In Kratzer’s theory preorders are generated by an “ordering source” g, or set
of propositions (indexed to the world of evaluation): for any worlds w′ and w′′, w′ is at least
as good as w′′ relative to the ideal set up by g(w) iff all propositions in g(w) that are true in
w′′ are also true in w′.
De nition . w′ ≲g(w) w′′ ∶= ∀p ∈ g(w)∶w′′ ∈ p⇒ w′ ∈ p
In broad outline, a second strategy— call it ‘ ’— aims to explain the differ-
ence between circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings of ‘ought’ in terms of a dif-
ference in ordering source. It analyzes (a) evidence-sensitive readings of ‘ought’ in terms
of an ordering source that encodes the values of various outcomes conditional on (perhaps
among other things) some relevant epistemic state being such-and-suchway, (b) circumstan-
tial readings of ‘ought’ in terms of an ordering source that encodes the objective values of
various outcomes, and (c) hypothetical deontic conditionals in terms of the latter (objective)
kind of ordering source.
e ordering source implicated in the interpretation of an evidence-sensitive ‘ought’ sen-
tence like (), or at least a simpli ed version of such an ordering source, might be something
like the following.
() gsubj(w) =
{ the way is clear and we know it ⊃ we switch to the ,
the way is blocked and we know it ⊃ we stay put,
we don’t know whether there is construction on the  ⊃ we stay put }
With suitable constraints on the relevantmodal base— e.g., assuming it’s restricted to worlds
where we don’t know whether there is construction on the — (), on its evidence-sensitive
reading, will come out true with respect to this ordering source. e ≲gsubj(w)-best worlds
among those where we don’t know whether the way is clear or blocked are all worlds where
we stay put. ese worlds make true all three propositions in the ordering source (vacuously
ere are several ways of integrating ordering sources into our semantics from §.. One option would be
to treat g as a function fromworlds and information states to sets of propositions; gwould be type ⟨s, ⟨st, ⟨st, t⟩⟩⟩.
An ordering on worlds could be generated as follows:
(i) w′ ≲g(w)(s) w′′ ∶= ∀p ∈ g(w)(s)∶w′′ ∈ p⇒ w′ ∈ p

in the case of the rst two), whereas worlds in which we don’t stay put fail to make true
the third proposition above. In this way, the strategy is to build information-sensitivity into
the ordering source by including propositions expressed by sentences that describe relevant
features of the agent’s epistemic state (and the state of the world) in the antecedents, and
describe the actions available to the agent in the consequents. (For the sake of argument
I bracket worries about whether an ordering source like the one in () will generalize to
more complex cases, e.g., where the relevant epistemic states must be given a more ne-
grained characterization. For I will argue that even if it can, we still have reasons to prefer
an information-sensitive analysis of the sort developed in §..)
By contrast, the ordering source implicated in the interpretation of a circumstantial
‘ought’ sentence like () might be something like this:
() gobj(w) =
{ the way is clear ⊃ we switch to the ,
the way is blocked ⊃ we stay put }
With suitable constraints on the relevantmodal base— e.g., assuming it’s restricted to worlds
where the way is clear— (), on its circumstantial reading, will come out true: the ≲gobj(w)-
best worlds where the way is clear are all worlds where we switch to the .
Similarly, if we assume a covert modal analysis for overtly modalized deontic hypotheti-
cal conditionals (as described at the end of §.), we will be able to derive the truth of (). As
suggested in the truth-conditions in (), rst we restrict ourselves to worldsw′ in which the
way is clear. Assuming that the deontic ideal in these worlds is the same as that in the world
of evaluation— i.e., assuming that gobj(w) = gobj(w′)—the ≲gobj(w′)-best of the (circumstan-
tially) accessible worlds w′′ from w′ will all be worlds where we switch to the  (assuming
that all such worlds w′′ are still worlds where the way is clear). So, () is correctly predicted
to be true.
In theseways, this implementation of the standardKratzer semanticsmay be able tomake
the correct predictions about our example sentences (though see below). ‘Ought’s notional
sensitivity to information may be captured in the semantics by encoding relevant features of
the agent’s decisionproblem— thepossible states of theworld, the agent’s epistemic state, and
the available actions— into propositions in the ordering source, rather than by giving ‘ought’

an information-sensitive semantics of the sort described in §.. is is an important point
to acknowledge since much of the recent literature has assumed that the standard Kratzer
semantics is necessarily inconsistentwith the data. edatamay not force us to treat ‘ought’
as an “informational modal,” to use Kolodny and MacFarlane’s terminology (: ), or
as having its domain of quanti cation determined relative to an information state supplied
from the point of evaluation.
is leaves us with two theories, both of which are adequate to our original data. As is of-
ten the case, howwe decide between themmay depend largely on theoretical considerations.
ough how such considerations tally up can be a subtlematter, I would like to present a pre-
liminary case that the alternative theory developed in §.— call it ‘-
’— is the better package deal. ere are reasons for preferring a theory on which
circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings of ‘ought’ result from how circumstantial and
epistemic modal bases, respectively, interact with the same information-sensitive preorder
selector. In short, -  seems to offer a more uni ed anal-
ysis of all the relevant readings of deontic modals.
First, -  treats phrases like ‘in view of the evidence’
and ‘in view of the circumstances’— as in () and ()— as having their usual import and
role: As on Kratzer’s stated view, these phrases are used to specify the two main kinds of
modal bases. By contrast,   stipulates that in certain examples with deontic
modals, these phrases suggest something about what ordering source is relevant (e.g., one
like gsubj or gobj) and do so in unpredictable ways. ere is no independent motivation I
know of for this stipulation.
Second, -  better captures the common normative el-
ement in circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings of ‘ought’. What makes a normative
modal the kind of normative modal that it is— e.g., rational, moral, prudential, etc.— is the
preorder with respect to which it is interpreted. I- , unlike
For example: “on any setting for the modal base and ordering source standardly considered, the frame-
work fails to predict the [evidence-sensitive] reading on which [()] is true”; “the… ordering source runs into
a technical problem when it comes to the interaction with conditional antecedents” (C  . :
, ; though see –). “Standard quanti cational semantics for deontic modals… are not able to capture
these facts [about information-sensitivity]” (L : ). Cf. K & MF : 
and C a: . See also D  and  F  for discussion.

 , captures how it is a constant set of values or norms that are used to assess
the deontic betterness-making features of acts and worlds in the interpretation of circum-
stantial and evidence-sensitive readings of ‘ought’. (For instance, according to utilitarianism,
the ordering source implicated in both readings might be something like {We maximize ex-
pected utility}, where “expectedness” is determined in light of the given modal base.) As
the ‘in view of the evidence’ and ‘in view of the circumstances’ phrases suggest, it is simply
the relevant body of information which changes (and which then interacts with the rele-
vant information-sensitive norm). is view also better illuminates why various normative
ethicists have thought to engage in the project of attempting to analyze (in my terminol-
ogy) circumstantial ‘ought’s in terms of evidence-sensitive ‘ought’s or vice versa. But if the
ordering sources implicated in the interpretation of both readings were logically unrelated
in the manner suggested by  , this project might seem to be conceptually
confused.
ird, -  better captures the close semantic connec-
tion between unembedded evidence-sensitive ‘ought’ sentences like () and deontic condi-
tionals like (). As suggested in §., evaluations of conditional expected utility— expected
utility given a condition—play an important role in rational choice theory and decision
making more generally. It would be surprising if we could not express such evaluations in
natural language. I- , unlike  , captures
how deontic conditionals like () can express such evaluations—namely, by interpreting
‘ought’ with respect to the same preorder selector that is used in interpreting unembedded
evidence-sensitive ‘ought’ sentences. (ough, again, such sentences need not express judg-
ments of expected utility, and information-sensitive preorder selectors need not be conse-
quentialist.) Further,   seems to predict that there would be a kind of equiv-
ocation in accepting () and then accepting () upon learning that the way is clear.
() In view of the evidence, we ought to switch to the .
Whatever is going on in the successive interpretations of these sentences, it does not seem
that it is the ordering source that is changing. When we learn new factual information— for
example, that the antecedent condition of a deontic conditional like () obtains—we can
See, e.g., B : –, G a: –, : –, W .

conclude something about what we subjectively ought to do. (As we’ll see in the following
section, even if the inference from () and its antecedent condition to its consequent is not
classically valid, it seems to be dynamically valid.)
To bring this out, consider the following variant on our original case. e case is the
same as before except that now there are three ways we can get to the hospital: we can stay
along our current route, we can switch to Route , or a bit farther down we can switch to
Route . Route , like Route , has had construction on it lately, but when it’s clear it is the
fastest route to the hospital. (When it’s blocked, it’s as slow as the .) We don’t know whether
Route  is clear today, but our evidence strongly suggests that construction work is done on
the  and the  on the same days. Call this case ‘ ’. e following conditional seems
true:
() If Route  is clear, we ought to take Route .
On the condition that Route  is clear, switching to Route  is the expectably best action.
I-  captures this: the preorder is indexed to our current
information state updated with the information that Route  is clear. Relative to this updated
information state, our taking Route  is best. However, suppose that unbeknownst to us, it
turns out that Route  is clear but Route  is blocked. en, since   interprets
the ‘ought’s in deontic hypothetical conditionals as having a circumstantial reading, or as
taking an objective ordering source, () is incorrectly predicted to be false. e lesson: e
‘ought’s in deontic conditionals like () and () are not given objective or circumstantial
readings. ey are evidence-sensitive—or, better, evidence-sensitive on a condition.
In reply   could drop its claim that the ‘ought’ in a deontic hypotheti-
cal conditional takes an objective ordering source. Instead it could claim that the ‘ought’ is
interpreted with respect to a sort of hybrid ordering source— in the case of (), perhaps
something like the following:
() gsubj∗(w) =
{ the  is clear ⊃ we switch to the ,
the  is clear ⊃ we switch to the ,

the way is blocked ⊃ we stay put,
⋮
}
Given the sorts of assumptions discussed in the case of (), () will come out true with re-
spect to this ordering source. P  can indeed capture our new data. But, as
suggested above, it does so in such a way that leaves opaque the connection between the
norms used in assessing claims like (), (), (), and, now, (). More pressingly,  
is only the rst of a long line of more complex cases in which, roughly, what is objectively
best comes apart from what is expectably best, which comes apart from what is expectably
best on one condition, which comes apart from what is expectably best on another con-
dition, and so on. For each evaluation of what is expectably deontically best on a given
condition C, for variable C—and for the interpretation of each associated hypothetical con-
ditional—we will need a new ordering source. It is plausible that a theory that uni es these
ordering sources and treats context as making a uniform contribution to the interpretation
of all such conditionals (and their unembedded, evidence-sensitive counterpart) is to be pre-
ferred. I-  does just that.
So, even if   is empirically adequate, there are good reasons for thinking
that -  yields the better overall theory.
. Information-sensitivity and modus ponens
So far, so good. But as the reader may have noticed, there is a perhaps surprising feature
about the joint consistency of certain of our examples, reproduced below: Modus ponens is
violated. (What is at issue here is the validity of modus ponens for the indicative conditional,
not, e.g., the truth-functional material conditional.)
() a. We ought to stay put. (⇒ It’s not the case that we ought to switch to the .)
b. If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
c. e way is clear.

e recent treatment of deontic conditionals in K & MF  has made
much of this point. ough they consider a more complicated case involving construc-
tive dilemma, this is unnecessary. e violation of modus ponens is evident even in non-
hypothetical contexts, as in (). at modus ponens fails is unsurprising given our seman-
tics (cf. K & MF : –). First, though it might be true that the
way is clear, the epistemic modal base for the unembedded ‘ought’ in (a) need not encode
this information. Since deontic preorders can be sensitive to what the set being preordered
is like, the mere truth of a proposition, together with the truth of an associated conditional
‘ought’, won’t entail the conditional’s modalized consequent. Second, since the consequent
of a hypothetical conditional is interpreted with respect to its local context, the deontic pre-
order is sensitive to the information expressed by the antecedent in a way that affects the
modal’s domain of quanti cation. So, the sentences in (), even when the ‘ought’s are given
the same reading without equivocation, can all be true with respect to a constant global con-
text. (I assume that it is this notion of validity—which requires interpretation with respect
to a constant global context— that is relevant for the evaluation of a logical argument for a
particular conclusion.)
But if modus ponens fails in this way, can we still account for how, in practical delib-
eration, we can legitimately detach unembedded evidence-sensitive ‘ought’ claims from as-
sociated conditionals upon learning that the latter’s antecedent condition obtains? Yes: Al-
though modus ponens is not (neo)classically valid, modus ponens inferences like the ones
Cf. K & L ,  F , , L & L : –. More for-
mally:
(i) α, . . . , αn ⊧ β iff for all contexts c∶ JαKc ∩ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∩ JαnKc ⊆ JβKc
It is worth noting that denying an information-sensitive semantics of the sort described in §. won’t allow
one to hold on to modus ponens for the indicative conditional— at least if one accepts a Kratzerian restrictor
analysis for conditionals: such an analysis doesn’t validate modus ponens anyway (pace suggestions in D
). Simple countermodels with and without the postulation of a covert higher modal:
Proof. Overt modal restriction: Supposew is the world of evaluation, f(w) = {w,w},w is a (ϕ∧ψ)-world,
w is a (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)-world, and w <w w. en ‘ϕ’ is true (since w is a ϕ-world), and ‘If ϕ, ought ψ’ is true
(since w, the ≲w-best ϕ-world in f(w), is a ψ-world), but ‘Ought ψ’ is false (since w, the ≲w-best world in
f(w) is a ¬ψ-world).
Proof. Covert modal restriction: Start with the same model as before, but where f(w) is the modal base of the
covert higher modal. Assume that f ′(w), the modal base of the overt modal at w, is {w}. en ‘ϕ’ is true
and ‘Ought ψ’ is false for the same reasons as in the rst proof; but ‘If ϕ, ought ψ’ is true since for all ϕ-worlds
w′ in f(w)—namely, w —the ≲w′-best worlds in f ′(w′) is aψ-world (sincew is the only such worldw′).

we are considering are dynamically valid. Roughly, for a set of premises to dynamically en-
tail a conclusion, it must be that when the premises are successively asserted (and accepted),
the context set of the evolving context is included in the proposition expressed by the con-
clusion in that evolved context. In assessments of dynamic validity, premises not only play
their usual classical role of ruling out possibilities; they also change the context, and hence
information state, with respect to which subsequent sentences are interpreted.
Informally, suppose we start in a context that leaves open whether the way is clear. I
assert (), which is successfully added to the common ground.
() If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
Next, I learn that the way is clear and so assert ().
() e way is clear.
Since () is not only true but is also accepted, the context set is reduced to worlds where the
way is clear. But this updated context is precisely the one relevant in the interpretation of the
consequent of ()! So, the resulting context set entails— is a subset of— the proposition
expressed by ().
() We ought to switch to the .
us, () and () dynamically entail (). More formally (cf. n. ):
Proposition . JIf ψ, ought ϕKc,w = JψKc,w =  implies JOught ϕKc,w = , where c = c ∩
Compare the notion of a “reasonable inference” in S , an important inspiration for much
work in dynamic semantics. See W  for elaboration on the importance of a dynamic notion of log-
ical consequence in logics and semantics for information-sensitive deontic modals. A related but importantly
different notion is Kolodny and MacFarlane’s notion of “quasi-validity” (: –). Roughly, an argu-
ment is quasi-valid iff it is (neo)classically valid when its premises are epistemically necessary. As Kolodny and
Macfarlane show, modus ponens is quasi-valid. However, as Willer observes (n.), a notion of quasi-validity
may havemore limited importance since it does not apply in hypothetical reasoning and fails to capture certain
intuitively valid forms of inference (cf. S ).
More formally (cf.  F : –; G : –):
(i) α, . . . , αn ⊧dynamic β iff for all contexts c∶ JαKc ∩ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∩ JαnKc∣α∣...∣αn−∣ ⊆ JβKc∣α∣...∣αn∣
I put this (contentiously) in terms of context change potentials merely for notational convenience. See, e.g.,
G & S ,  B , , V , and M  .  for
discussion of various possible notions of dynamic entailment.

JIf ψ, ought ϕKc and c = c ∩ JψKc .
Proof. Suppose that JIf ψ, ought ϕKc,w = JψKc,w = . So, by De nitions  and , ∀w′ ∈
D (c ∩ JψK,≲w, c∩ JψK) ∶ JϕKc,w′ = . Assume that updating with ‘If ψ, ought ϕ’ doesn’t af-
fect the deontic preorder— i.e., that ≲w, c∩ JψK= ≲w, c ∩ JψK , indeed thatD (c ∩ JψK,≲w, c∩ JψK) ⊇
D (c ∩ JψK,≲w, c ∩ JψK). Since JψKc = JψKc ,D (c ∩ JψK,≲w, c∩ JψK) ⊇ D (c ∩ JψKc ,≲w, c ∩ JψKc).
But c = c ∩ JψKc . So, it follows that D (c ∩ JψK,≲w, c∩ JψK) ⊇ D (c,≲w,c). So, since JϕKc =JϕKc , ∀w′ ∈ D (c,≲w, c) ∶ JϕKc,w′ = .
In this way, in deliberation and conversation we can legitimately detach claims about what
we ought to do— in the subjective, evidence-sensitive sense— from associated deontic con-
ditionals upon learning the truth of their antecedent conditions.
. Conclusion
Let’s take stock. On rst glance it appeared that the standard Kratzer semantics for modals
was incomplete; it seemed to be silent on how to interpret claims about what one ought to
do in view of the evidence. While a quick x was apparently available—namely, allowing
deontic modals to take epistemic modal bases—we have seen that a more radical revision
of Kratzer’s ordering semantics may be called for. On the analysis defended here, modal
bases do not simply restrict deontic preorders; they help determine what the preorder is.
By making the deontic preorder information-re ecting— indexed to a set of worlds—we
can improve on    and   and give a uni ed explanation for
how changes in modal base help generate circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings
of deontic ‘ought’. e intended readings of deontic ‘ought’ conditionals follow from the
information-sensitivity of the preorder selector and independent principles concerning local
interpretation. e project here has not been to argue that no other theory can get the data
right. Rather it has been tomotivate building information-sensitivity into our semantics and
articulate one way of doing so that is empirically adequate and theoretically attractive.
By dropping philosophical assumptions that may have been implicit in Kratzer’s original
analysis, we have opened up new ways of generating the desired predictions about various
phenomena involving deontic ‘ought’. And we have done so in a way that better captures the

common core of the modals than we otherwise would have. is, I take it, is an instance of
a more general methodological lesson. e linguist, like any other practicing scientist, oen
comes to the theoretical table with various implicit philosophical views. e acceptance of
such assumptions can oen inadvertently restrict the space of possible analyses to be given
in response to new data. By locating these assumptions, the philosopher of language can,
among other things, free up the linguist and help expand the range of candidate theories.
Appendix Evidence-sensitivity in DRT
I have argued that deontic preorders used in interpreting ‘ought’ can be sensitive to what
the modal base is like and how it is updated locally. Since Discourse Representation eory
(DRT) has been enormously fruitful in its treatment of sentence-internal context updates,
in this appendix I will formalize the more theory-neutral analysis of information-sensitivity
from §. using DRT. Of course there will be alternative implementations.
A DRT: Some background
A Discourse Representation Structure (DRS) represents the body of information accumu-
lated in a discourse. A DRS consists of a universe of “discourse referents” (objects under
discussion), depicted by a set of variables, and conditions that encode information gathered
in the discourse. Syntactically, algorithms map syntactic structures onto DRSs. Seman-
tically, DRSs are interpreted model-theoretically by embedding functions—functions from
discourse referents to individuals in a model such that for each discourse referent x, the in-
dividual that x is mapped onto has every property associated with the conditions on x. Truth
is then de ned at the discourse level rather than at the sentence level: roughly, a DRSK is true
in a modelM iff there is an embedding function for K inM that veri es all the conditions
in K. Different types of conditions have different veri cation clauses (see below).
A simple example should clarify. Take the single-sentence discourse ‘John killed aminer’.
e following DRS represents the information that there are two individuals— John and a
Discourse referents can be understood as entities that can serve as antecedents for anaphora— introduced
non-linguistically or linguistically by inde nite NPs—modeled as constraints on assignment functions. ey
needn’t correspond with referents in the model. See K  for classic discussion.







An embedding function f veri es () in a modelM iff the domain of f includes j and m,
and according toM, f(j) is John, f(m) is a miner, and f(j) killed f(m). Roughly, the DRS
() is true in a modelM iff there is an embedding function inM that veri es all its con-
ditions—here, iff there is an embedding function inM such that j can be mapped onto an
individual in the model, John, and m can be mapped onto an individual which is a miner
in the model, such that the individual corresponding to j killed the individual correspond-
ing to m. e universe of this DRS is {j,m} and the condition set is {John(j), miner(m),
killed(j,m)}. is DRS forms the background context against which subsequent utterances
are interpreted.
Modally quanti ed sentences inducemore complexDRSs. For concreteness, I will follow
the DRT analysis of modals in F . As contexts are oen represented in dynamic
theories of interpretation in terms of sets of states—sets of world-embedding function pairs
⟨w, e⟩—Frank, following G , introduces context referents that denote such sets.
Update conditions G ∷ F + K′, from an input context referent F with a DRS K′ to an output
context referent G, are used to represent the dynamic meaning of sentences in a discourse.
A bit of terminology:
De nition . A Discourse Representation Structure (DRS) K is an ordered pair ⟨UK = UKind ∪
UKcont ,ConK⟩, where UKind is a set of variables, UKcont a set of context referents, UK the universe of
K, and ConK a set of conditions.
De nition . An embedding function f for K in an intensional modelM is the union of an
embedding function f and an embedding function f, where:
See also P , R . Cf. S , , B , B , which
analyze modal quanti ers in terms of discourse referents for static, rather than dynamic, objects, e.g., sets of
possible worlds.

. f for K inM is a (possibly partial) function from UKind into D.
. f for K inM is a (possibly partial) function from UKcont into sets of states ⟨w, f⟩.
For embedding functions f and g and DRS K, g extends f with respect to K—written ‘f[K]g’— iff
Dom(g) = Dom(f) ∪UK and f ⊆ g.
A modal’s nuclear scope— the DRS representing its prejacent— is treated as anaphoric
to an antecedent context referent that is updated with the restrictor. (is is intended to
capture, among other things, Kratzer’s notion of relative modality, or the claim that modals
are interpreted relative to a contextually supplied set of premises.) is anaphoric analysis
yields the following general logical form for modals Q (depicted with a diamond) in (),
relative to an anaphoric context referent X′, restrictor DRS K′, scope DRS K′′, and context




G′ ∷ X′+ K′
Q G′′ ∷ G′ + K′′
ere are a number of ways to render the computation of the modal’s domain of quanti ca-
tion information-re ecting. Here I will do so by treating the denotation of a deontic context
referent D as a function from a set of worlds (an information state) to a set of states, those
states consistent with what is deontically required in view of that information state. For ease
of exposition I abstract away from details involving Kratzer’s ordering source and treat a de-
ontic modal’s modal base as complex, consisting of a merged context R + D, where R is the
relevant “realistic” (circumstantial, epistemic) context. Speci cally, I assume that the com-
plex modal base B is formed from the merge of a realistic context R and a deontic context D
that takes R as argument: B = R + D(R). e denotation of B determines the set of worlds
σ(e(B)) = σ(e(R)) ∩ σ(e(D)(e(R)))—i.e., the set of worlds consistent with the relevant
body of facts or evidence and what is deontically required relative to the information state
determined by that body of facts or evidence. e set of worlds (“context set”) σ(Γ) deter-
mined by a set of states Γ is given as follows:

De nition . σ(Γ) = {w′∶ (∃x′)⟨w′, x′⟩ ∈ Γ}, for a set of states Γ
Some relevant veri cation conditions (see, e.g., F ,  E & K ,
K  .  for fuller treatments):
De nition . For all worlds w, (well-founded) embedding functions e, f, g,h with domains in
UK, intensional modelsM, DRSs K,K′,K′′, and sets of conditions Con:
. e truth-conditions of a DRS K inM:
(a) JKK⟨w,f⟩ = {⟨w, g⟩∶ f[K]g& ⟨w, g⟩ ⊧M K}
(b) A DRS K is true inM iff ∃f∶ ⟨w, f⟩ ⊧M K
. e context change potential of a DRS K inM w.r.t input and output states ⟨w, f⟩, ⟨w, g⟩:
⟨w,f⟩JKK⟨w,g⟩ iff f [K] g& ⟨w, g⟩ ⊧M K
. Veri cation of a DRS K inM by embedding function e:
⟨w, e⟩ ⊧M ⟨K⟩ iff ∃f∶ e[K]f& ∀c ∈ ConK∶ ⟨w, f⟩ ⊧M c
(a) ⟨w, e⟩ ⊧M Pn(x, . . . , xn) iff ⟨e(x), . . . , e(xn)⟩ ∈ I(Pn)
(b) ⟨w′, e⟩ ⊧M G ∶∶ F + ⟨K′⟩ iff e(G) = {⟨w′, g⟩∶ ∃⟨w′, f⟩ ∈ e(F) s.t. ⟨w′,e∪f⟩JKK⟨w′,g⟩}&
∃⟨w, g⟩ ∈ e(G)
(c) ⟨w, e⟩ ⊧M G ∶∶ X′ + ⟨K′⟩ ◇every H ∶∶ G + ⟨K′′⟩ iff
e(G) = {⟨w′, g⟩∶ ∃⟨w′, x′⟩ ∈ e(X′) s.t. ⟨w′,e∪x′⟩JKK⟨w′,g⟩}&
e(H) = {⟨w′,h⟩∶ ∃⟨w′, g⟩ ∈ e(G) s.t. ⟨w′,e∪g⟩JKK⟨w′,h⟩ &
∀⟨w′, g⟩∶ ⟨w′, g⟩ ∈ e(G)→ ∃⟨w′,h⟩ ∈ e(H)}
(d) ⟨w, e⟩ ⊧M G = F +D(F) iff
e(G) = {⟨w′, g⟩∶ ∃⟨w′, f⟩ ∈ e(F) ∃⟨w′,d⟩ ∈ e(D)(e(F)) s.t. ⟨w′, g⟩ = ⟨w′, f ∪ d⟩}
B e data
Turning to our data, rst let’s analyze (), our evidence-sensitive unembeddeddeontic ‘ought’.
e (partial) DRS for () will be roughly as in (). Let F be the context that encodes our

evidence; D encode what is deontically required; and Λ be the empty context that begins the
discourse, where e(Λ) = {⟨w′, λ⟩∶w′ ∈W} and λ is the empty function.
() We ought to stay put.
Λ F G D
F ∷Λ + x group(x)
G ∷ F +
G′ G′′ X′
X′ = F +D(F)
G′ ∷ X′+ every G′′ ∷ G′+ stay-put(x)
e le-hand subordinate box is empty since the modal’s domain is already restricted by
virtue of being anaphoric to the prior context F. Importantly, what is deontically required
anaphorically depends on the realistic context F. e complex modal base X′ = F + D(F)
restricts the modal’s domain of quanti cation to worlds that are consistent with the avail-
able evidence and what is deontically required relative to this evidence— i.e., to worlds in
σ(e(F)) ∩ σ(e(D)(e(F))). Accordingly () is true iff in all of these worlds, we stay put.
More generally, the modal condition in the DRS updating F is veri ed iff every state in the
denotation ofX′ can be extended to a state that veri es the scopeDRS stay-put(x) . Since the
deontic context is sensitive to what the epistemic context is, this modal condition is indeed
veri ed.
Now reconsider our circumstantial ‘ought’ in (). e DRS for () will be much like that
in (); however, the modal’s restriction will be anaphoric, not to F, but to F∗, a context
referent that encodes the relevant facts about the situation.
I assume a syntacticized version of Kratzer’s semantics for modals, though nothing here hinges on this.
Also, our DRSs are merely partial representations, so not all conditions encoding our evidence or the relevant
circumstances are given in the representations that follow.

() We ought to switch to the .
Λ F∗ G D
F ∷Λ + x group(x) the_(a)
G ∷ F +
G′ G′′ X′
X′ = F∗ +D(F∗)
G′ ∷ X′+ every G′′ ∷ G′+ switch(x, a)
So the context set of the denotation of F∗ includes only worlds where the  is clear. Since
the deontic context D is sensitive to this, the modal condition, evaluated with respect to the
complex modal base X′ = F∗ + D(F∗), is veri ed. We switch to the  in all worlds in the
context set of the denotation of X′—i.e., all worlds in σ(e(F∗)) ∩ σ(e(D)(e(F∗))).
Turning to (), in order to capture how the ‘ought’ is interpreted with respect to its local
context, we need to ensure that the deontic context merges with the updated modal base
that includes the condition encoded by the ‘if ’-clause in forming the modal’s complex modal
base. So, the DRS in () will not provide the correct representation of (). e problem is
that the complex modal base X′ = F +D(F) is formed before the context is updated with the
restrictor DRS clear(a) .
() If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
Λ F G D
F ∷Λ + x a group(x) the_(a)
G ∷ F +
G′ G′′ X′
X′ = F +D(F)
G′ ∷ X′+ clear(a) every G′′ ∷ G′+ switch(x, a)

So, if we are to correctly represent the intended readings of deontic conditionals like ()
within our current semantic framework, we may need to posit a covert necessity modal that
scopes over, and is restricted by, the ‘if ’-clause. (Alternative frameworksmay not require this
move.) As brie y mentioned in §., such a move has much independent support— e.g., in
light of data with anankastic conditionals, nominally quanti ed ‘if ’- and ‘unless’-sentences,
and ‘might’-counterfactuals— though, for reasons of space, I will not rehearse those argu-
ments here (see n. ). Suffice it to say that this independently motivated element helps yield
the accurate representation of () in ().
() If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
Λ F G D
F ∷Λ + x a group(x) the_(a)
G ∷ F +
G′ G′′ X′
X′ = F
G′ ∷ X′+ clear(a) every G′′ ∷ G′ +
H′ H′′ X′′
X′′ = G′ +D(G′)
H′ ∷ X′′+ every H′′ ∷H′+ switch(x, a)
emodal base X′ of the covert modal is anaphoric to the context referent F that encodes the
available evidence (see §§.–.). e complex modal base X′′ of the overt deontic ‘ought’
is identi ed with the update of X′ with the DRS representing the ‘if ’-clause merged with
the deontic context— i.e., X′′ = G′ +D(G′). Crucially, this allows the information-sensitive
deontic contextD to interact with the context referent G′ that encodes the condition that the
way is clear, rather than with F, which does not. So the embedded ‘ought’ quanti es over
worlds in which the way is clear that are consistent with the evidence and what is deontically
required relative to this updated information state. Accordingly, the modal condition in G is
veri ed; we switch to the  in all worlds in σ(e(X′′)).

Finally, a brief word about the ‘even if ’ conditional in (). Independent considerations
from F  suggest that in modalized ‘even if ’ conditionals, the embedded modal’s
modal base is anaphoric to the non-updated context referent X′ = F, rather than to the up-
dated context G′ as in ()— in Kratzerian terms, to the higher modal’s modal base f(w)
rather than to f+(w). is is represented in ().
() Even if the way is clear, we ought to stay put.
Λ F G D
F ∶∶ Λ + x a group(x) the_(a)
G ∶∶ F +
G′ G′′ X′
X′ = F
G′ ∶∶ X′+ clear(a) every G′′ ∶∶ G′ +
H′ H′′ X′′
X′′ = X′ +D(X′)
H′ ∶∶ X′′+ every H′′ ∶∶ H′+ stay-put(x)
If this position on ‘even if ’ conditionals is right, we have an independently motivated way of
predicting the appropriate truth-conditions for (). As in (), what is deontically required
is calculated relative to the non-updated information state that encodes our actual evidence.

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